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Abstract 
Food recalls have been an issue of great concern in the food industry. Stakeholder 
responses to food safety scares can cause significant economic losses for food firms.  Assessing 
the overall impact that may result from a food recall requires a thorough understanding of the costs 
incurred by firms. However, quantifying these costs is daunting if not impossible. A direct 
measurement of a firm’s total costs and losses of revenue associated with a food recall requires 
firm-level data that is not available.  The method utilized in this study overcomes this severe 
limitation.  Using an event study, the impact of meat and poultry recalls is quantified by analyzing 
price reactions in financial markets, where it is expected that stock prices would reflect the overall 
economic impact of a recall.  A unique contribution of this study is evaluating whether recall and 
firm specific characteristics are economic drivers of the magnitude of impact of meat and poultry 
recalls on stock prices. 
Results indicate that on average shareholders’ wealth is reduced by 1.15% within 5 days 
after a firm is implicated in a recall involving serious food safety hazards.  However, when recalls 
involve less severe hazards, stock markets do not react negatively.  Also, reductions in company 
valuations return to pre-recall levels after day 20.  Firm size, firm’s experience, media information 
and recall size are drivers of the economic impact of meat and poultry recalls.  That is, firms 
recalling a larger amount of product perceive greater reductions in company valuations.  
Additionally, recalls issued by larger firms are less likely to present negative effects on stock 
prices, compared to smaller firms.  Moreover, firms that have recently issued a recall are less 
harmed by a new recall compared to those firms issuing a recall for first time.  Thus, suggesting 
that investors take into consideration the past performance of a company when dealing with food 
recalls.  Furthermore, media information has a negative impact on shareholder’s wealth.  Findings 
  
from this study provide essential information to the meat industry.  In particular, understanding 
the likely impact of such “black swan” events is critical for firm’s investing in food safety 
technologies and protocols. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
Food recalls have been an issue of great concern in the food industry.  In recent years the 
number of identified and reported incidents of contaminated food products has dramatically 
increased as has public awareness of food safety breaches, thus elevating consumers’ concerns 
about the safety of our food.  On the supply side, stakeholder responses to food safety scares can 
cause significant economic losses for food firms.  As a preventive measure, firms invest substantial 
resources into minimizing food safety hazards.  However, optimal investment is elusive because 
food contamination incidents are difficult to predict and even more, their probable economic 
impact is unknown.  In addition to economic repercussions related to the reduction in product 
demand, triggered by a decline in consumer or customer confidence, firms involved in food-related 
outbreaks incur expenses of recovering, disposing of, or reconditioning food products already in 
the market pipeline (Thomsen and McKenzie, 2001).   
Depending on the severity of the threat and its potential effects on the wellbeing of 
consumers, firms may also face product liability costs which can permanently damage a firm’s 
reputation and even force the firm to exit the market.  For example, in 1997, Hudson Foods Co. 
recalled 25 million pounds of ground beef (one of the largest recalls of food in the U.S.) due to 
foodborne contamination that caused several illnesses. This particular event resulted in the 
company’s acquisition by Tyson Foods, after losing its largest customer, Burger King (Belluck, 
1997).  Food contamination incidents may also influence the decisions of food company investors.  
That is, product recalls negatively affect the firm’s stock prices because of the adverse effect on 
current and future profitability of the firm involved (Salin and Hooker, 2001; Thomsen and 
McKenzie, 2001; Wang et al., 2002). 
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 1.1 Motivation 
Assessing the overall impact that may result from a food recall requires a thorough 
understanding of the costs incurred by firms.  However, quantifying these costs is daunting if not 
impossible. A direct measurement of a firm’s total costs and losses of revenue associated with a 
food safety outbreak requires firm-level data that are not available, and often, not even the firm 
involved has the data necessary to undertake an economic assessment.  To overcome this severe 
limitation, previous work has quantified the impacts of food recalls by analyzing price reactions 
in retail, futures and financial markets during the periods surrounding the recall announcement.  
Of particular interest in this study is the assessment of price reactions in financial markets, since 
it is expected that stock prices would reflect the overall economic impact of a recall through the 
expected impact on the future profitability of the firm involved. 
Food recalls do not cause the same adverse effects in all companies.  Thomsen and 
McKenzie (2001) found significant shareholder losses when publicly traded food companies were 
implicated in a recall involving serious food safety hazards (e.g., foodborne disease outbreaks), 
indicating that reductions in company valuations are contingent on the overall human health risk 
associated with the consumption of adulterated or misbranded products.  Moreover, the amount of 
product that is implicated in a food safety problem determines the size of a recall.  It may not be 
accurate to assume that firms recalling a small amount of product would be affected in the same 
manner as firms recalling millions of pounds of product.  Therefore, recall size has the potential 
to influence firms’ valuations during a food safety incident.   
Furthermore, previous literature shows that media information accompanying a food safety 
scare has the potential to decrease consumer demand for the implicated product (Piggott and 
Marsh, 2004; Schlenker and Villas-Boas, 2009).  However, while some food recalls have received 
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widespread media coverage, others have barely made it to the news.  Thus, raising the question of 
whether the effects of media information impacting consumer perceptions regarding the safety of 
a product and the firm producing the product, are translated into financial markets. 
Different types of publicly traded firms are responsible for food safety.  These firms have 
different sizes and differ according to their scale of operations and levels of diversification.  This 
distinction is important for the analysis of stock market reactions to food safety scares because 
investors are suspected to include into their stock valuations risk perceptions about firms.  That is, 
larger firms, likely to operate numerous plants or produce an array of different products that are 
not affected by the recall, are expected to have smaller economic impact, all else constant.  
Additionally, a firm’s past experience managing recalls can influence the outcome from 
contamination incidents on the market value of firms (Salin and Hooker, 2001; Wang et al., 2002).  
That is, firms undertaking an effective food safety crisis management strategy have the potential 
to minimize the stock market reaction. 
Altogether, this evidence indicates that the impact of a food recall on the value of a firm is 
likely to depend on factors associated with the specific recall and the firm issuing the recall.  
However, previous work has not assessed how the magnitude of stock market price reactions to 
recalls is determined by a broader set of important factors.  This study is designed to directly 
address this important gap in information.  
 1.2 Objectives 
The objectives of this study are twofold.  The first one is to quantify the impact of meat 
and poultry recalls on related financial markets.  More specifically, reductions in food company 
valuations that result from meat and poultry recalls are calculated using an event study approach 
based on daily stock prices.  Assuming the impact of a recall will be reflected in adverse stock 
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price movements, this approach allows comparing observed stock prices with those that would 
have been expected to occur in the absence of a recall. 
The second objective is to determine how specific factors associated with meat and poultry 
recalls and the firms involved, explain the magnitude of stock prices reactions.  In particular, the 
focus of this study is on factors such as: severity of the health threat, size of the recall, firm size, 
firm structure (e.g. level of diversification), firm’s experience, media information surrounding the 
recall and important meat industry events. 
 1.3 Meat and Poultry Recalls 
Recalls of meat, poultry and processed egg food products are carried out under the 
supervision of the United States Department of Agriculture Food Safety and Inspection Service 
(FSIS).  Typically, meat and poultry products that have already been shipped and distributed into 
the market and are suspected of being potentially hazardous to public health, are voluntarily 
recalled by firms either by their own initiative or by the request of FSIS.  When a product is 
recalled, FSIS issues a recall release to the media in the affected area, sends it to public health 
partners and stakeholders and posts it on the FSIS website.  However, FSIS will not issue a recall 
release when the company is able to regain control over adulterated product distributed solely to 
the wholesale level.  A recall can occur for many different reasons.  Among these are foodborne 
illness outbreaks, undeclared allergens, contamination with foreign materials (e.g., plastic, glass 
and metals), mislabeling, and underprocessing or undercooking.  The most severe type of recalls 
involve meat products contaminated with foodborne bacteria such as Escherichia coli O157:H7 
(E. coli), Listeria monocytogenes or Salmonella.   
There are several ways a firm may learn about a potential recall situation.  These include: 
through FSIS, firm’s customers, consumer complaints, its own laboratory analysis reports, or 
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through reports from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC) or from other federal agencies.  When the establishment believes that 
adulterated or misbranded product has been shipped into the market, it must notify FSIS within 24 
hours.  Then, a recall committee will assess whether it is necessary to recommend a recall based 
on a series of protocols, which includes the evaluation of the severity of the recall based on 
potential health risk.  Once this committee determines that the establishment must undertake a 
recall, FSIS issues a recall release.  If an establishment refuses to conduct a recall, FSIS personnel 
have the right to detain any product found in commerce that would have been subject to a recall 
(FSIS Directive, 2014).  A recall is terminated after FSIS determines that all reasonable efforts 
have been made to recover the product in question. 
Despite firms’ efforts to adopt preventive measures and invest in food safety enhancing 
technologies, firms may encounter food safety threats during production, processing or packaging 
of food products.  Human errors and limitations of food safety technologies make zero food safety 
tolerance impossible.  In the last two decades, FSIS has reported almost 1,300 meat and poultry 
recalls, representing nearly 638 million pounds of product, from January 1, 1994, through 
December 31, 2013.  Of the total, almost three-fourths corresponded to the most severe class of 
recalls (FSIS, 2014).1  These recalls come at the expense of the firm directly involved and can 
create substantial losses. 
                                                 
1 Class I recalls are the most serious and involve a “situation where there is a reasonable probability that the use of the 
product will cause serious, adverse health consequences or death.”  Class II recalls involve a “situation where there is 
a remote probability of adverse health consequences from the use of the product.”  Class III recalls involve a “situation 
where the use of the product will not cause adverse health consequences.”  
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 1.4 Importance of Study 
Results from this study provide essential information to the meat industry.  Particularly, 
understanding how food safety recalls impact a firm’s value is necessary for firms to evaluate 
strategies of adopting and investing in new, often expensive, food safety technology and protocols.  
In addition, results will demonstrate how a variety of factors influence the economic impact of a 
meat recall event.  This information is valuable to managers as they assess potential costs or 
revenue losses associated with specific characteristics of a food safety recall.  Furthermore, results 
also benefit investors as they may find it valuable to have information related to the duration of 
the effects of meat recalls on stock prices.  Lastly, understanding the likely impact of meat recalls 
events is critical for policy makers to establish and evaluate food safety regulations.  
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Chapter 2 - Literature Review 
This section provides an overview of relevant literature related to food recalls and other 
food safety scares.  The first subsection presents a discussion of how financial markets have been 
impacted by food safety incidents.  The second subsection focuses on reviewing studies assessing 
consumer responses to food recall announcements and other food safety scares.  The third 
subsection summarizes main findings regarding food safety scares in the futures markets literature.  
Finally, studies related to food safety regulations and recall management are reviewed in the fourth 
subsection. 
 2.1 Financial Market Reactions to Food Recalls and Other Food Safety 
Scares 
The study of financial market reactions to food recalls provides important information to 
firms and the industry in general.  That is, the magnitude of a stock market reaction can be 
compared to the direct costs incurred by the implicated firms.  Consequently, this magnitude can 
be used to assess the benefits of implementing new technologies or food safety protocols, and even 
further, the adoption of an industry level food safety management system (Salin and Hooker, 
2001).  
 2.1.1 Effects of Meat and Poultry Recalls on Financial Markets 
Several studies have assessed the impact of meat and poultry recalls in financial markets.  
Using an event study approach, Thomsen and McKenzie (2001) examined reductions in food 
company valuations that resulted from meat and poultry recalls supervised by FSIS.  Significant 
shareholder losses were found when companies were implicated in a recall that caused serious 
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threats to consumer health (1.5-3 percent reduction in stock returns).  Here, the most adverse 
reactions occurred within 6 trading days after the recall announcement.  On the contrary, recalls 
that involved less severe food safety hazards, had no negative impact on stock markets.  This 
finding indicates that the magnitude of impact of meat and poultry recalls depends on the recall 
class.  The present study extends Thomsen and McKenzie’ (2001) analysis to evaluate what factors 
(other than recall class) related to the meat recall, as well as the firm involved, help explaining the 
magnitude of stock markets’ reactions.  This study also addressed the issue of clustering among 
recalls using a test of significance that accounts for the cross-sectional correlation of returns, 
instead of removing important observations out of the sample.  In addition, since their study was 
conducted in 2001, important conclusions can be drawn from updating and comparing results.  
Salin and Hooker (2001), evaluated stock markets’ reactions to food recalls caused by 
microbiological contamination using a partial event study approach.  Their main focus was on four 
different recalls: Odwalla apple juice contaminated with E. coli O157:H7 in 1996, two IBP recalls 
involving ground beef also contaminated with E. coli O157:H7 bacteria in 1998 (6 months between 
each other), and Sara Lee hot dogs contaminated with Listeria monocytogenes in 1998.  Stock 
returns fell immediately after the recall for the smaller firms in the study (Odwalla and first IBP 
recall), but recalls by the larger firm (Sara Lee) were not consistently associated with large 
reductions in stock returns.  The second IBP recall did not have a significant negative impact in 
stock returns as did the first one, suggesting that the market had learned from the earlier recall.  
The authors argued that perhaps IBP sent a good signal to investors after handling the first recall, 
indicating that contamination incidents did not have long-term impacts on shareholders’ wealth.   
In a similar study, Wang et al. (2002) evaluated stock market responses to five meat recalls 
from two different companies (Sara Lee and IBP), using a Generalized Autoregressive Conditional 
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Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) framework.  The first recall from each company, had significant 
negative effects on stock returns, whereas the subsequent recalls did not affect stock returns.  The 
authors also found volatility spillovers across firms, suggesting that recalls caused by bacterial 
contamination can potentially have widespread effects on the industry.  Findings from both studies 
suggest that other factors that could potentially influence the magnitude of the effects of food 
recalls are the size of the firm, the firm’s experience and whether or not the recall was caused by 
a foodborne pathogen.  
 2.1.2 Effects of the Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Outbreak on Financial 
Markets 
The first case of BSE reported in the U.S. in December 2003, had a substantial impact in 
the livestock and meat industries.  Following its discovery, some countries closed their doors to 
U.S. products, costing beef export markets over $3 billion in 2002 (Unnevehr, 2004).  Jin and Kim 
(2008) studied the BSE outbreak and its effects on the security values of U.S. agribusiness and 
food processing firms, using an event study approach.   Looking at 23 different securities, results 
showed that security values of firms in the category of “mixed meats” were negatively affected, 
whereas firms in the category of “other meats” were positively affected.  Also, some firms in the 
“farm machinery and equipment” sector were negatively affected because of its positive 
relationship with farm income.  Furthermore, the authors argued that the response of U.S. 
consumers to this outbreak was not prominent, whereas the response by shareholders of U.S. firms 
in the meat and poultry industry was significant.  A possible explanation for this finding is that the 
ban imposed on U.S. products by major importing countries impacted investors decisions.  
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 2.2 Consumer and Retail Market Reactions to Food Safety Scares 
A product recall alters investors’ expectations about future earnings.  Since these 
expectations are estimated based on the firm’s revenue, reductions in revenue and increases in 
costs attributed to the recall, result in lower expected earnings per share and, consequently, lower 
share prices.  Consumers directly affect the firm’s revenue by changing their purchasing patterns. 
Therefore, it is important to understand how consumers and the retail market react to food safety 
scares.  
 2.2.1 Consumer Reactions to Food Safety Scares 
Numerous studies have addressed how consumers’ purchasing patterns are affected by food 
recalls.  For example, Marsh, Schroeder and Mintert (2004) analyzed the impact of meat recalls 
on aggregate demand for beef, pork and poultry products using a Rotterdam demand model.  
Including recall indices as demand shifters, findings revealed that recalls caused small but 
statistically significant responses.  Own and cross-effects indicated that meat recalls induce a 
reallocation of expenditure both within the meats group and across meat and non-meat groups. 
Using disaggregated data Thomsen, Shiptsova and Hamm (2006) estimated sales losses 
experienced by food processing companies following a recall caused by Listeria monocytogenes.  
This study used branded frankfurter products to assess substitution effects associated with a food 
scare that can be directly linked to one or more brands.  Product sales of affected brands decreased 
by 22-23% after the outbreak.  On the contrary, non-recalled brands experienced an increase of 
sales when a competing brand was involved in a recall.   
In a similar study, Bakhtavoryan, Capps and Salin (2012) evaluated spillover effects among 
peanut butter brands, initiated by the 2007 Peter Pan recall, using Nielsen Homescan data.  
Changes in own-price and cross-price relationships among peanut butter brands following the 
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recall, suggested that the recall caused a structural change in the demand for peanut butter.  
However, after 27 weeks Peter Pan recovered from this food safety crisis.   
Furthermore, Arnade, Calvin and Kuchler (2009) employed a two-stage almost ideal 
demand system (AIDS) model and weekly scanner data to investigate the impact of an E. coli 
O157:H7 outbreak linked to spinach. Consumers substituted spinach with lettuce, and moved away 
from bagged salads that did not contain spinach, indicating a negative spillover effect on other 
leafy greens.  However, retail expenditure for all leafy greens only declined 1 percent after 68 
weeks, whereas for bagged spinach it decreased 20%.   All these findings reveal consumers change 
their purchasing patterns after a recall by reallocating their budget on what they believe are 
unaffected products (substitutes).  However, in some cases, uninvolved brands (or products) also 
suffer from sales losses, although it appears this effect is short-lived. 
 2.2.2 Influence of Media Coverage on Consumer Reactions towards Food Recalls 
The news media has long been a primary source of consumer information relating to food 
safety.  Today, consumers receive instant information through the use of technology and social 
media.  Thus, immediately influencing their perception and reaction towards a recalled product 
and the company involved.  Several studies have addressed the impacts of food safety information 
on consumer demand.   
Smith, van Ravenswaay and Thompson (1988) estimated sales loss following a food safety 
incident involving fresh fluid milk contaminated with pesticide in Hawaii, in 1982.  They modeled 
consumer responses to a contamination incident in function of their information about the quality 
of the product.  Assuming consumers’ primary source of information is the media coverage of the 
incident, they built a media index based on newspaper articles.  These articles were coded either 
as positive or negative depending on the type of information presented and when an article 
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contained both types of information, each sentence was assigned a value and the sum of values 
determined the code given to the article.  In addition, these articles were weighted using a scale 
from 0 to 5 depending on their location in the newspaper (e.g., front page of a section, etc.).  A 
total of 41.7 million pounds of milk was not sold because of this incident, and after receiving 
compensations, sales losses amounted to $26,000 per producer.  Additionally, negative media 
coverage had a larger effect on consumers’ perceptions compared to positive media coverage.  
Although government officials assured the safety of the remaining milk after the contaminated 
product was removed out of the shelves, consumers did not respond immediately.  This article was 
among one the first empirical studies that compared the impact of positive and negative media 
information.   
Similarly, Richards and Patterson (1999) used an equilibrium displacement approach to 
calculate the effects of negative or positive news regarding a disease outbreak on the profits of 
strawberries growers.  Positive and negative media articles had the expected effects on price, but 
negative reports had a greater effect on price than positive reports.   
In a more recent study, Piggott and Marsh (2004) developed a theoretical and empirical 
framework of consumer response to publicized food safety information on meat and poultry 
demand.  Including food safety indices constructed based on newspaper articles, the empirical 
analysis showed the average demand response to food safety events was economically small, 
except in periods of a significant food safety outbreak.  In addition, adverse publicity concerning 
the safety of a product depressed its demand.  However, this impact was small and short-lived.   
Laestadius et al. (2012) analyzed the content of newspaper articles covering the 2010 Iowa 
egg recall caused by a Salmonella outbreak.  The main focus of this analysis was to evaluate the 
media impact on public support for food safety policy reforms needed to prevent future outbreaks.  
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Articles were categorized according to several parameters including: focus of coverage (e.g., egg 
recall, politics and food safety), causal factors (e.g., poor production practices, lack of government 
oversight) and possible solutions (e.g., consumer actions, alternative eggs, policy actions, etc.) 
among others.  Although media coverage conveyed the policy relevance of the recall, it failed to 
contextualize the issue within the food safety policy agenda of that time. 
Focusing on a different type of media coverage, Schlenker and Villas-Boas (2009) used an 
event study approach to examine how U.S. consumers reacted to two highly publicized warnings 
about bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE): the first discovery of an infected cow in 
December 2003 and an Oprah Winfrey show that aired in 1996.  Large and significant drops in 
beef sales followed both episodes. Particularly, implications are that receiving coverage in one of 
America’s most-watched television programs can impact markets in a sizeable way compared to 
government warnings combined with continued general news coverage.  They concluded, printed 
media is not the only source of information able to alter consumer demand patterns.  Although 
other alternatives have been proposed to the inclusion of media indices in consumer demand 
analysis (Mazzocchi, 2006), these articles demonstrate that media coverage play a crucial role in 
determining market response to a food scare.  Hence, the inclusion of media indices in this study. 
 2.3 Futures Market Reactions to Food Safety Scares 
While food recalls and other food safety scares have the potential to adversely affect 
consumer demand and retail market responses, they are also expected to cause a downward 
movement in futures prices as traders react to potential declines in derived demand triggered by 
negative consumer responses.  Several studies have analyzed futures markets’ reactions to food 
recalls and other food safety scares.  For example, McKenzie and Thomsen (2001) examined the 
impact of E. coli O157:H7 meat and poultry recalls (supervised by FSIS) on farm and wholesale 
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level beef prices, using an event study.  The farm prices used were live cattle cash price and 
settlement prices for nearby live cattle futures contracts, and the wholesale prices used were the 
90 percent lean boneless beef price index and the USDA’s boxed beef cutout price for choice 
carcasses.  Although wholesale prices of boneless beef were negatively affected by recalls, farm 
and wholesale prices of boxed beef showed either insignificant or very limited response to the 
recalls. 
Lusk and Schroeder (2002) analyzed the effect of beef and pork recalls on live cattle and 
lean hogs futures markets using an event study approach.  Particular focus was given to test 
whether size and severity of meat recalls statistically affected daily futures prices.  Medium-sized 
beef and large-sized pork recalls with serious health concerns had a marginally negative impact on 
the nearby cattle and lean hogs futures market prices.  Although the authors did not find significant 
effects of recall size on futures prices, it raises the question of whether stock prices are influenced 
by this recall characteristic.  Furthermore, Moghadam, Schmidt and Grier (2013) investigated the 
effect of meat and poultry recalls (supervised by FSIS) caused by E. coli O157:H7 on nearby cattle 
futures prices, using an event study.  Recalls had an adverse impact on cattle futures prices. 
However, this impact was short-lived.  These findings contradict those from McKenzie and 
Thomsen (2001), indicating that recalls had no impact on cattle futures prices.    
Focusing on a widespread food contamination event, Carter and Smith (2007) assessed 
market responses to the food-corn supply contamination by a genetically modified corn variety 
called StarLink that was not approved for human consumption.  On September, 2000 the 
Washington Post reported the detection of traces of StarLink in taco shells in the U.S. which led 
to food recalls of approximately 300 food products and eventually, a decrease of U.S. corn exports 
to Japan (the largest single importer of U.S. corn at that time) of about 8 percent.  To estimate the 
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price effect of this event on the U.S. corn market, the authors developed a new approach called the 
relative price of a substitute (RPS) method, which exploits the equilibrium properties of the relative 
price of the commodity of interest to a substitute good.  Using the stable relationship between 
sorghum and corn spot prices, the StarLink contamination incident decreased corn prices by 6.8 
percent for at least a year.  
Looking at the effects of media coverage in agricultural commodity markets, Attavanich, 
McCarl and Beesler (2011) evaluated lean hogs, live cattle, corn and soybeans futures prices 
responses to the 2009 H1N1 flu, inappropriately labeled at the beginning of the outbreak as “swine 
flu,” using a subset vector autoregressive model.  Media coverage was associated with a significant 
negative effect on lean hogs futures prices, but slight impact on the other futures prices.  This 
impact, which persisted for about four months, occasioned market revenue loss of about $200 
million.  Hence, indicating that futures markets are also influenced by media coverage. 
 2.4 Food Safety Regulations and Recall Management 
Food safety scares have the potential not only to alter consumers’ purchasing patterns, but 
also shake public trust in food safety regulatory agencies and decrease confidence in the safety of 
the food supply chain (Onyango et al., 2008).  Periodic discovery of contaminated meat and poultry 
products led the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the FSIS to develop a quality control 
system that improves the scientific basis for meat and poultry inspection and mitigates the firm’s 
economic losses.  In 1996, the FSIS published a final rule that mandates all federally inspected 
meat and poultry plants to adopt a food safety control system known as HACCP (Hazard Analysis 
Critical Control Points).  HACCP is a food safety monitoring system designed to identify and 
prevent hazards (e.g. introduction of pathogens or foreign materials) along the production process. 
This program was established to improve the safety of meat and poultry products by placing more 
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emphasis on preventing potential hazards, rather than detecting and treating contamination 
problems at the end of the production line (Unnevehr and Jensen, 1996).  The movement towards 
the implementation of mandatory HACCP regulations led researchers to investigate the benefits 
and costs of such regulations.  For example, Roberts et al. (1996) and McDonald and Crutchfield 
(1996) estimated that the cost of designing and implementing a HACCP plan is lower on a per unit 
basis for a larger food processing firm compared to smaller firms.  Thus, the regulatory costs 
imposed on smaller firms negatively impacted their competitiveness.  However, the econometric 
estimates were based on data taken before the rule was issued.  
Jensen et al. (1998) discussed preliminary results from a cost-effectiveness analysis of 
several technological interventions for microbial control in beef and pork processing.  Their results 
suggested that marginal improvements in food safety can be obtained at increasing costs.  Antle 
(2000) developed a theoretical model and estimated a cost function to test the hypothesis that 
product safety does not affect variable cost of production in the meat industry.  After rejecting this 
hypothesis, results from the cost function were used to estimate the impacts of food safety 
regulations on the variable cost of producing beef, pork, and poultry.  He concluded the costs of 
food safety regulation could plausibly exceed the benefits estimated by previous studies.  More 
recently, Ollinger and Moore (2009) evaluated the costs of HACCP.  Economies of scale in the 
implementation of the system provide larger firms with substantial cost advantage over smaller 
firms.  In addition, the implementation of federal mandated food safety regulations is five times 
more costly than using generic performance standards.  Altogether, these findings indicate that 
complying with food safety regulations can be costly, especially for small firms. 
Focusing on food recall management, Hooker, Teratanavat and Salin (2005) examined the 
overall effectiveness of food recall management efforts undertaken by meat and poultry plants, 
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supervised by FSIS.  To conduct this analysis, three measures of recall effectiveness were defined: 
recovery rate, completion time and recovery rate-completion time ratio.  In addition, managerial 
and technical variables were compared to these measures of effectiveness.  Recalls carried out by 
the smallest size plants, those that took place after the implementation of HACCP and recalls 
involving processed products are more effective.  Furthermore, although Class I recalls involve 
severe health hazards to consumers, there is no evidence that these are more effectively managed.    
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Chapter 3 - Methods 
This chapter is divided into two subsections: event study and effects of meat recall 
characteristics.  The former, provides a discussion regarding the conceptual framework driving 
this analysis and also, a detailed explanation of empirical methods used to calculate the magnitude 
of impact of meat recalls on stock prices – this magnitude of impact is known as abnormal returns.  
In addition, this subsection illustrates the implementation of parametric and non-parametric tests 
used to assess the level of significance of estimated abnormal returns.  The latter provides a 
description of methods used to evaluate the effects of meat recall characteristics on post event 
abnormal returns.  Here, the application of cross-sectional and panel data models is discussed. 
 
This chapter is divided into two subsections: event study and effects of meat recall 
characteristics.  The former, provides a discussion regarding the conceptual framework driving 
this analysis and also, a detailed explanation of empirical methods used to calculate the magnitude 
of impact of meat recalls on stock prices – this magnitude of impact is known as abnormal returns.  
In addition, this subsection illustrates the implementation of parametric and non-parametric tests 
used to assess the level of significance of estimated abnormal returns.  The latter provides a 
description of methods used to evaluate the effects of meat recall characteristics on post event 
abnormal returns.  Here, the application of cross-sectional and panel data models is discussed. 
 
 3.1 Event Study 
To assess the impact of meat recalls on the market value of firms, ideally one would like 
to compare the firm’s actual stock returns to the returns the firm would have experienced in the 
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absence of the recall (known as normal return).  The event study approach provides a framework 
for estimating this normal return.  This method was introduced by Ball and Brown (1968) and by 
Fama et al. (1969), and since then it has been widely used in the fields of economics, finance, 
accounting, and marketing.  The usefulness of event studies comes from the assumption that the 
effects of an event will be reflected immediately in stock prices. Therefore, a measure of the 
event’s economic impact can be constructed using stock prices observed over a relatively short 
period of time, instead of using direct profit or cost related measures (MacKinlay, 1997). 
 3.1.1 Conceptual Framework 
The theory underlying the use of the event study method is the efficient market hypothesis 
(EMH).  This hypothesis implies that stock prices will reflect the discounted value of future 
earnings and all available information that influences the market upon which a firm's stock is 
traded.  Here, the discount rate is determined by the perceived riskiness of the firm. Therefore, 
changes in stock prices, and thus firm’s value, reflect changes in expectations about future earnings 
and risk.  In other words, this hypothesis assumes that new information is quickly incorporated 
into stock prices as investors continually re-evaluate the firm’s value (Srinivasan and Hanssens, 
2009).  
In general terms, stock prices are defined as: 
  (1) 𝑃𝑡 =  ∑
𝐸𝑆𝑡
(1 + 𝑟)𝑡
?̂?
𝑡=1
,  
where, 𝐸𝑆 represents the stream of future earnings per share at time 𝑡 and  𝑟 is the company’s risk 
adjusted discount rate.  It is important to note that product recalls might affect 𝑃 through either 𝐸𝑆 
or 𝑟.  That is, as investors recalculate the value of stock prices considering their risk perceptions, 
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they are implicitly affecting the value of  𝑟.  In a similar fashion, as consumers and customers 
include new information into their recalculation of product quality, they would affect the value 
of  𝐸𝑆.  The current empirical framework, however, does not allow estimating the impact of 
product recalls using this distinction.  In other words, it only allows estimating overall impacts. 
 3.1.2 Abnormal Returns Modeling 
The assessment of the event’s impact on stock prices requires a measure of the abnormal 
return.  The abnormal return is defined as the difference between the actual ex post return of the 
stock and the normal return, both calculated over the event window.  The normal return is defined 
as the expected return without conditioning on the event taking place (MacKinlay, 1997).  For firm 
𝑖 and event date 𝑡 the abnormal return is defined as: 
  (2) 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝑅𝑖𝑡 −  𝐸[𝑅𝑖𝑡| 𝐼𝑡 ],  
where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the actual return of a stock at time 𝑡, 𝐸[𝑅𝑖𝑡| 𝐼𝑡 ] is the normal return conditional on 
some information 𝐼𝑡 which allows one to predict the expected return had the event not occurred.  
A test of statistical significance for the abnormal return is constructed using the following 
hypothesis: 
  (3) 𝐻𝑜:  𝑅𝑖𝑡 −  𝐸[𝑅𝑖𝑡| 𝐼𝑡 ] = 0,   
 
 
The null hypothesis is that the value of the actual return, conditional on the event, is not different 
from the expected value of the normal (benchmark) return.  The test in equation (3) can be 
generalized to deal with aggregation over time.  Note that returns on stock investments are used 
instead of stock prices in order to account for dividend payments and capitalization (Fama et al., 
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1969).2  Daily returns for firm’s 𝑖 stock are calculated as the percentage change in closing stock 
prices as: 
  (4)     𝑅𝑖𝑡 =
 𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝐷𝑖𝑡 − 𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1
,       𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇 
where  𝑃𝑖𝑡 is the stock price of firm 𝑖 observed at the end of day 𝑡.  𝐷𝑖𝑡 are the dividends per share 
paid at time 𝑡, and 𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 is the stock price of firm 𝑖 observed at the end of day  𝑡 − 1.  𝑇 denotes 
the total number of observations of time series data (may vary across firms) and 𝑛 is the total 
number of firms considered in the analysis. 
In the application of event study to meat recalls, six steps are followed: (i) identify the 
event timeline which consists of dates before, on and after the recall announcement; (ii) model the 
normal behavior of the returns according to a benchmark model estimated using observations prior 
to the recall announcement; (iii) forecast the expected returns over the event window using the 
benchmark model; (iv) compute the difference between actual and expected returns to obtain a 
measure of abnormal returns; (v) aggregate abnormal returns over intervals of the event window 
to obtain the cumulative impact of a meat recall on the value of firm 𝑖 –these aggregated measures 
are known as cumulative abnormal returns (𝐶𝐴𝑅);  (vi) aggregate 𝐶𝐴𝑅 over events (recalls) to 
obtain a measure of the cumulative average abnormal returns (𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅);  (vii) test for the statistical 
significance of 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅. 
Figure 3.1 illustrates the timeline of the event study where observations are divided into 
two mutually exclusive sub-periods: the estimation window and the prediction window.  The 
                                                 
2 In addition, from an econometrics standpoint, using returns instead of stocks allows accounting for the presence of 
unit roots in the time series sample.  
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estimation window contains observations prior to the recall announcement (i.e., 𝑡 ∈ [𝑇1 + 1, 𝑇2]).  
The prediction window, also referred to as the event window, contains the day of the recall 
announcement (i.e.,  𝑡 = 0 ) and observations surrounding the event day (i.e., 𝑡 ∈ [𝑇2 + 1, 𝑇3]).  
Here, several trading days before the event are included to account for the possibility that stock 
markets become aware of food safety outbreaks before the formal announcement date.3  To model 
the normal behavior of stock returns, a benchmark model is estimated using observations from the 
estimation window.  Then, this model is used to predict or forecast normal returns (those expected 
to occur in the absence of a meat recall) using observations from the event window. 
 
Figure 3.1  Event Study Timeline 
Defining 𝐿1 = 𝑇2 − 𝑇1 as the length of the estimation window and 𝐿2 = 𝑇3 − 𝑇2 as the 
length of the event window, the estimation window considered in this study consists of 𝐿1 = 250 
trading days.  Previous studies have considered event windows beginning at day [𝑇2 + 1] = – 10 
(Thomsen and McKenzie, 2001).  However, to account for the sensitivity of results to the choice 
                                                 
3 In some cases, firms may determine to issue a recall as many as 24 hours before FSIS is formally notified, while in 
others, FSIS might require additional evidence (e.g., inconclusive laboratory results) before issuing a recall.  Thus, 
any of this situations may allow the stock market to learn about the recalls before its official announcement.  
T3T1 T2 T40
Estimation Window
Event Window
Post- Event Window
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of sampling periods, event windows starting at day [𝑇2 + 1] = – 10 and [𝑇2 + 1] = – 5 are used.  
That is, the estimation window  [𝑇1 + 1, 𝑇2] is equal to [–260, –11] and [–255, –6] trading days, 
respectively.  In addition, alternative lengths of event windows are examined to allow for 
comparison of cumulative effects after the recall.  Hence, 𝑇3 is specified as +5, +10, +15 and +20 
trading days (Salin and Hooker, 2001). 
There are two main statistical approaches used to estimate normal returns. These are the 
constant mean return model and the market model.  The constant mean return model assumes that 
average returns are constant across time and any unexpected news will cause returns to deviate 
from this constant mean. Using this approach, normal returns are estimated as: 
  (5) 𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝜇𝑖 −  𝜈𝑖𝑡,   𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙  𝑡 ∈ [𝑇1 + 1, 𝑇2],  
where 𝜇𝑖 is the mean stock return for firm 𝑖 and 𝜈𝑖𝑡 is the error term.  On the other hand, the market 
model assumes that returns of stock prices are correlated with returns of a market portfolio.  That 
is, returns are assumed to be a linear function of the overall market index (e.g., S&P 500, NASDAQ 
Composite, NYSE Composite, etc.) and deviate out of this relationship in the presence of an event.  
Here, normal returns are estimated as: 
  (6) 𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡,   𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙  𝑡 ∈ [𝑇1 + 1, 𝑇2],  
where 𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the return of the market index at date 𝑡;  𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑖 are parameters to be estimated and 
reflect the mean excess return (or unsystematic risk) and the systematic risk of firm’s 𝑖 stock, 
respectively (Mazzocchi, Ragona and Fritz., 2009); and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term assumed to be 
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independent and normally distributed with zero mean.4  Once estimates of 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑖 are obtained 
using observations from the estimation window, it is possible to predict (out of sample) normal 
returns from the event window as:  
  (7) 𝐸[𝑅𝑖𝑡| 𝐼𝑡 ] =  ?̂?𝑖 +  ?̂?𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡,   𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑡 ∈ [𝑇2 + 1, 𝑇3].  
Then, daily abnormal returns are calculated as: 
  (8) 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝑅𝑖𝑡 −  ?̂?𝑖 − ?̂?𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡,   𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑡 ∈ [𝑇2 + 1, 𝑇3].  
Mackinlay (1997) suggests that the market model represents a potential improvement over 
the constant mean return model because it allows reducing the variance of the abnormal return by 
removing the portion of the return that is related to the market’s return variation.  This in turn can 
increase the ability to detect event effects.  Therefore, in this study, normal returns are estimated 
using the market model. 
The market model in equation (6) relies upon the assumption that the residuals 𝜀𝑡 are 
serially uncorrelated.  However, significant serial correlation is probable, particularly among food 
firms that perceive thin trading in some days (Henson and Mazzocchi, 2002; Mazzocchi, Ragona 
and Fritz, 2009).  This issue is addressed by employing an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) 
specification of the market model: 
  (9) 𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖𝑅𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡−1 +  𝜀?̃?𝑡,   𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙  𝑡 ∈ [𝑇1 + 1, 𝑇2]. 
                                                 
4 According to Fama (1976), stock returns are not normally distributed. Thus, this issue needs to be accounted for 
when conducting hypothesis testing.  
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Abnormal return observations must be aggregated in order to draw overall inferences for 
the event of interest (MacKinlay, 1997).  Thus, abnormal return measures are aggregated over time 
into a measure of cumulative abnormal returns, reflecting the change in stock prices caused by a 
particular meat recall over an interval of the event window.  Cumulative abnormal returns for 
firm’s 𝑖 stock return, calculated over an interval 𝜏 = [𝜏1, 𝜏2] consisting of one or more days, are 
obtained as: 
  (10) 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝜏1, 𝜏2) =  ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝜏2
𝑡=𝜏1
,  
where 𝑇2 < 𝜏1 ≤  𝜏2 ≤ 𝑇3. 
Then, the average proportional impact of a meat recall is obtained by taking the mean of 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝜏1, 𝜏2) over the 𝑁 recall events in the sample:
5 
  (11) 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅(𝜏1, 𝜏2) =
1
𝑁
 ∑ 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝜏1, 𝜏2)
𝑁
𝑖=1
.  
That is, the magnitude of 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅(𝜏1, 𝜏2), known as cumulative average abnormal returns, reflects 
whether the observed stock price movements are the result of meat recall events.  Thus, the primary 
interest of this analysis is to test the following hypothesis: 
  (12) 𝐻𝑜:   𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅(𝜏1, 𝜏2) ≥ 0,  
                                                 
5 It is important to note that a particular firm could register more than one recall over the sample period.  Thus, instead 
of aggregating over 𝑛, the total number of firms considered in this study, the aggregation is performed over the total 
number of recalls.  
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𝐻𝑎:   𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅(𝜏1, 𝜏2) < 0. 
Under the null hypothesis, recall outbreaks do not have a significant impact on stock prices and 
consequently 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅(𝜏1, 𝜏2) will be zero, whereas under the alternative hypothesis recalls have a 
significant impact on stock prices causing 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅(𝜏1, 𝜏2) to be negative. 
    3.1.3 Statistical Tests of Abnormal Returns 
There are two main problems related to statistical tests of abnormal returns that need to be 
considered in this study.  The first one is clustering (or cross-sectional correlation), which occurs 
when event windows overlap in calendar time.  Since traditional t-statistics assume independence 
of abnormal returns, results from hypothesis testing can be misleading (over-rejection of the null 
hypothesis).  Meat and poultry recalls occur frequently, so they are prone to portray cross-sectional 
correlation of abnormal returns.  Previous studies have addressed this issue by requiring a 
minimum number of trading days between events as a prerequisite for inclusion in the analysis 
(Moghadam, Schmidt and Grier, 2013; Thomsen and McKenzie, 2001).  This solution implies, 
however, reducing the event study sample and loosing relevant information about meat recalls.  As 
an alternative, the modified Boehmer, Musumeci and Poulsen (1991) t-statistic (hereafter ADJ-
BMP) proposed by Kolari and Pynnonen (2010) is used in this study to test the null hypothesis 
from equation (12).6  The advantage of using the ADJ-BMP t-statistic is that it takes into account 
cross-correlation.  Therefore, it is not necessary to reduce the event study sample to conduct 
statistical inference. 
The ADJ-BMP t-statistic for 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅s is calculated as follows: 
                                                 
6 This t-statistic is chosen over the adjusted Pattell’s (1976) t-statistic because it alleviates the issue of autocorrelation 
in cumulative abnormal returns by rescaling with cross-sectional standard deviation. 
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Step 1:  Estimate the variance of 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝜏1, 𝜏2), for which is necessary to first compute the 
conditional covariance matrix of abnormal returns (also known as forecast variance matrix) as 
follows: 
  (13) 𝐕𝒊 = 𝜎𝜀𝑖
2  [𝐈 + 𝐗𝑖
∗ (𝐗𝑖
′𝐗𝑖)
−1 𝐗𝑖
∗′],  
where 𝜎𝜀𝑖
2  is substituted by the estimated variance of the residuals from equations (6).7  𝐈 is an 
identity matrix of length 𝐿2 × 1.  𝐗𝑖
∗  is a 𝐿2 × 2 matrix of regressors used to forecast normal 
returns (it includes a vector of ones in the first column). And 𝐗𝑖 is a 𝐿1 × 2 matrix of regressors 
used to estimate equation (6).8  Then, the variance of 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝜏1, 𝜏2) can be computed as: 
  (14) 𝑠𝑖
2(𝜏1, 𝜏2) =  𝐖′𝐕𝒊𝐖,  
where 𝐖 is of dimension 𝐿2 × 1 with elements taking a value of one if 𝜏1 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝜏2 and zero 
otherwise. 
Step 2:  Calculate the standardized cumulative abnormal return (𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅) defined as: 
  (15) 
𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝜏1, 𝜏2) =  
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝜏1, 𝜏2)
√𝑠𝑖
2(𝜏1, 𝜏2)
. 
 
Step 3:  Calculate the cross-sectional standard deviation of  𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝜏1, 𝜏2) : 
                                                 
7 That is, 𝜎𝜀𝑖
2 ≈  ?̂?𝜀𝑖
2 =
1
𝐿1−2
𝜀?̂?
′𝜀?̂?, where 𝐿1= 250.  
8 In the case of the ARDL model, 𝐗𝑖
∗ is a 𝐿2 × 4 matrix, 𝐗𝑖  is a 𝐿1 × 4, and residuals are obtained from equation (9). 
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  (16) 𝑠𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅,𝜏 =  √
1
𝑁 − 1
∑(𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝜏 − 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝜏̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ )2
𝑁
𝑖=1
,  
where for convenience the subscript 𝜏 = (𝜏1, 𝜏2), and 
  (17) 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝜏 =  
1
𝑁
 ∑ 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝜏
𝑁
𝑖=1
.  
Step 4:  Compute the ADJ-BMP t-statistic for 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅(𝜏1, 𝜏2) : 
  (18) 𝑍𝐵𝑀𝑃,𝜏 =  
𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝜏 √𝑁
𝑠𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅,𝜏 √1 + (𝑁 − 1)?̅?
 ,   
where  ?̅? is the average of the sample cross-correlations of the estimation period residuals. 
The second problem regarding statistical inferences in event study analyses is that stock 
prices are not normally distributed (Fama, 1976), thus, the need to conduct nonparametric tests to 
address this issue (while also checking for the robustness of statistical inferences based on 
parametric tests).  Evidence suggests that, although nonparametric tests dominate their parametric 
counterparts in event study analyses of abnormal returns on a single day, they fail to do so when 
the analysis is extended to multiple day tests of cumulative abnormal returns (Kolari and 
Pynnonen, 2011).  To overcome previous pitfalls in nonparametric tests applied to 𝐶𝐴𝑅s, Kolari 
and Pynnonen (2011) propose a generalized rank (GRANK) testing procedure that can be used on 
both single day and 𝐶𝐴𝑅s.  This t-statistic is based on the traditional rank testing approach 
previously proposed by Corrado (1989) and Corrado and Zivney (1992). 
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The GRANK t-statistics for 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅s is computed as follows: 
Step 1:  Calculate the re-standardized 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅 using the cross-sectional standard deviation: 
  (19) 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝜏
∗ =  
𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝜏 
𝑠𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅,𝜏 
.  
Step 2:  Calculate the generalized standardized abnormal returns (𝐺𝑆𝐴𝑅) vector: 
  (20) 𝐺𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  { 
𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡             𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡 ∈ [𝑇1 + 1, 𝑇2]
 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝜏
∗          𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡 = 0                    
,  
where, 𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the standardized abnormal return of firm’s 𝑖 stock on day 𝑡, computed by dividing 
the abnormal return by the standard deviation of the residuals obtained from equation (6): 
  (21) 𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 
𝑠𝐴𝑅𝑖  
 .  
To derive the rank test, the time index is redefined such that 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇∗ = {𝑇1 + 1, … , 𝑇2, 0}, where 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝜏1, 𝜏2), represented by 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝜏
∗ , is introduced as a whole into one observation with time 
index  𝑡 = 0.  Thus, the length of  𝑇∗ = 𝐿1 + 1 observations. The idea behind 𝐺𝑆𝐴𝑅 is that the 
event impact is captured on a single measure  𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝜏
∗ , which under the null hypothesis behaves 
like any other standardized return, but it starts to deviate if affected by the event under the 
alternative hypothesis (Kolari and Pynonnen, 2011). 
Step 3:  Obtain the demeaned standardized abnormal return ranks of the 𝐺𝑆𝐴𝑅 vector (there is one 
vector for each 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 over interval 𝜏), as follows: 
  (22) 𝑈𝑖𝑡 =  
𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝐺𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡) 
𝐿1 + 1
−
1 
2
.  
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Step 4:  Compute the mean and standard deviation of 𝑈𝑖𝑡 for 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇
∗ = {𝑇1 + 1, … , 𝑇2, 0} and 𝑖 =
1, … , 𝑁. 
  (23) ?̅?𝑡 =  
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑈𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1
,  
  (24) 𝑆?̅? =  √
1
𝐿1
∑ ?̅?𝑡
2
𝑡∈𝑇∗
.  
Step 5:  Calculate the GRANK t-statistic defined as: 
  (25) 𝑍𝐺𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾,𝜏 =  ?̅?𝜏 (
𝐿1 − 2 
 𝐿1 − 1 − ?̅?𝜏
2)
1 
2
,  
where,  
  (26) ?̅?𝜏 =  
?̅?0
𝑆?̅?
,  
and, ?̅?0 is the mean ?̅?𝑡 at 𝑡 = 0. 
 3.2 Effects of Meat and Poultry Recall Characteristics 
The event study analysis is extended by examining what factors determine the magnitude 
of post event abnormal returns.  The main focus of this assessment is to estimate the effects of 
characteristics specific to meat and poultry recalls and the firm issuing the recall, which are 
considered as explanatory variables.  However, control variables are also introduced to avoid 
misspecification problems.  In addition, this analysis utilizes both cross-sectional and panel data 
type models.  In the cross-sectional model, the dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal 
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return over a particular interval of the event window.  On the other hand, the dependent variables 
in the panel model are either abnormal returns or cumulative abnormal returns.  The difference 
between these two models is that the panel model includes all cross-sectional observations from a 
particular interval of the event window, whereas the cross-sectional model includes one 
observation per interval.  Using both models, different intervals of the event window are analyzed 
to check whether the effects of explanatory variables change over time.   
Following Savor (2012), the cross-sectional model is specified as: 
  (27) 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝜏 =  𝜙0 + 𝜙1𝑋1𝑖 + ⋯ + 𝜙𝐽𝑋𝐽𝑖 + 𝜂𝑖 ,    
where, 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝜏 is the cumulative abnormal return for firm 𝑖 over interval 𝜏 starting 𝜏1 and ending 
𝜏2 trading days after the event day,  𝑋𝑗 are 𝐽 explanatory variables, 𝜙𝑗 are parameters to be 
estimated (for 𝑗 =1, 2,…, 𝐽), and 𝜂𝑖 is the error term with zero mean and assumed to be 
uncorrelated with the 𝑋′𝑠.9 This model is estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) and 
inference is based on robust standard errors when necessary. 
The panel model is specified as: 
  (28) 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝜃0 + 𝜃1𝑋1𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃2𝑋2𝑖 … + 𝜃𝐽𝑋𝐽𝑖 + 𝜉𝑖    𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑡 ∈ 𝜏,   
where, 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the cumulative abnormal return for firm 𝑖 at time 𝑡 over interval 𝜏.  Notice the 
inclusion of explanatory variables that have a time 𝑡 index (such as 𝑋1𝑖𝑡) indicating that these vary 
across time. As in the previous model specification, 𝜃𝑗  are parameters to be estimated (for 𝑗 =1, 
2,…, 𝐽), and 𝜉𝑖 is the error term with zero mean and assumed to be uncorrelated with the 𝑋′𝑠.  The 
                                                 
9 Because some firms register more than one recall, subscript 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁, where 𝑁 is the total number of recalls. 
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use of an aggregated variable (or a rolling sum of the original series) as the dependent variable are 
found in the finance literature (Campbell and Shiller, 1988; Fama and French, 1988).  Models that 
use this type of variables are known as long-horizon regressions.  In this literature, it is argued that 
long-horizon regressions produce more accurate results by strengthening the signal coming from 
the data while eliminating the noise.  Hence, these models have been extensively applied to stock 
returns predictability (Valkanov, 2003).  In this analysis, however, long-horizon observations for 
firm 𝑖 are pooled.  Thus, the resulting model is estimated as a panel data model, considering the 
implications of using long-horizon regressions.  The main inferential issue in long-horizon 
regressions has been the proper calculation of standard errors, since the regression residuals might 
exhibit strong serial correlation.  Therefore, inference is conducted using clustering robust standard 
errors.  Note that when the dependent variable is the abnormal return, the model is estimated using 
standard panel data approaches and inference is based on robust standard errors. 
 3.2.1 Explanatory Variables Definition and Justification 
The set of explanatory variables is divided into two groups: variables directly related to the 
meat recall and control variables associated with the firm.  That is, considering the post event 
behavior of stock returns would not be influenced solely by characteristics of the meat recall, 
control variables are included to enhance the predictability of the model and avoid misspecification 
problems.  The following are variables based on meat recall characteristics: 
a. Severity of the threat (Class).  There are three classes of FSIS meat recalls.  Class I recalls 
are the most serious and involve a “situation where there is a reasonable probability that 
the use of the product will cause serious, adverse health consequences or death.”  Class II 
recalls involve a “situation where there is a remote probability of adverse health 
consequences from the use of the product.”  And, Class III recalls involve a “situation 
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where the use of the product will not cause adverse health consequences.”  Hence, this 
variable categorizes a meat recall according to its class, where Class I recalls are anticipated 
to have a larger impact on abnormal returns than the other two.  
b. Recall Size.  The number of pounds recalled by a particular firm during a meat recall.  
Larger volume recalls are expected to have a larger impact on abnormal returns.   
c. Foodborne Pathogen.  Class I recalls can be caused by several reasons including foodborne 
pathogens.  Hence, this binary variable indicates whether market reactions to recalls that 
are triggered by a pathogen differ from those originated by other “less severe” reasons (e.g., 
foreign materials or undeclared allergens).   
d. Media Index. This index is constructed using the number of articles or media reports 
directly related to a particular meat recall.  The level of media coverage a recall receives 
(perceived as an indicator of the severity of the recall) would be expected to influence the 
firm’s stock price reaction.  
e. HACCP.  This variable is intended to capture the effects of the mandatory implementation 
of the Pathogen Reduction/HACCP final rule enacted on July 25, 1996.  The number of 
recalls have increased since this rule became mandatory (Teratanavat and Hooker, 2004) 
and as such this event could result in a structural change in market reactions to recall events. 
f. Diversification.  This variable captures in very broad terms the level of diversification of 
the firm involved in the recall.  That is, this variable indicates whether meat and poultry 
products are one of the main segments of production for a particular firm.  The expectation 
is that a firm that produces mostly meat and poultry products would be more affected by a 
recall than a more diversified firm.   
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g. Experience.  This variable measures whether a firm has been previously involved in a meat 
recall incident within the last year.  It is intended to capture the difference in stock market 
reactions between recurring firms and those issuing a recall for first time over the past year.  
h. Cluster.  This variable captures the effect of another recall (either from the same firm or 
from a different firm) that occurred within 10 days.  This variable is used to account for 
the cross-sectional correlation between recent recalls.   
 
Following Savor (2012), the following are control variables that are well known predictors 
of stock returns: 
i. Firm Size.  Market equity is used as a proxy for this variable.  It is calculated by multiplying 
the firm’s total number of shares outstanding by the closing market price ten days before 
the recall announcement.  Besides being an important predictor of stock returns, firm size 
is a potential determinant of the reduction in food company valuation caused by a food 
recall (Salin and Hooker, 2001). 
j. Trading Volume. Computed as the percentage of shares outstanding that is traded.  
k. Momentum.  Calculated as the return over the previous 12 months or annual return (before 
the recall announcement). 
l. Size of initial shock.  This variable is defined as the abnormal return registered at the event 
date (time 𝑡 = 0).  The size of the initial shock is expected to reflect the impact of the event 
day abnormal return.  
 3.2.2 Variables Not Included 
In addition to the variables indicated above, there are several other variables that may 
potentially help explain abnormal return variation following a food safety recall.  However, either 
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because of the lack of data or difficulty in specification, the variables have not been included in 
this analysis.  For example, “number of illnesses” or “recall scope” (number of states where tainted 
product has been distributed) are not included because this information is not available for all 
recalls.  We would expect these variables to be related to the severity and size of the recall, so 
likely some of these impacts are captured in those variables that are included in the models.  
Moreover, variables related to product type or level of processing are difficult to define.   That is, 
certain products can be easily classified according to their meat type (e.g., ground beef).  However, 
this is not the case for products containing more than one type of meat, such as sausages.  Also, 
classifying products as “branded” versus “non-branded” (or “generic”) is a difficult task because 
these latter products can come from different sources.  
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Chapter 4 - Data 
The effects of meat recalls on stock prices are analyzed from January 1994 to December 
2013.  Three different data sets were collected to conduct this analysis: meat recall data, firm data 
and media data.  These data and their different sources are described in subsections 4.1 – 4.3.  
Finally, summary statistics are presented in subsection 4.4.   
 4.1 Meat Recall Data 
Meat recall data were collected from the USDA FSIS website.  These data are publically 
available and can be found in the recall case archive.  Here, meat and poultry recalls are recorded 
by year, and each entry contains a case number and a recall report.  There are three types of recall 
reports: a recall release, a recall notification report (RNR) and a retail report (RTR).  When FSIS 
issues the recall, a recall release report is generated.  This report summarizes specific information 
such as issuance date, class, information related to the company recalling the product (e.g., 
company’s name, location, etc.), type of product subject to the recall (e.g., product’s name, type, 
labels images, “best by” date, product’s presentation, lot code, etc.), quantity recalled and 
recovered, cause for issuing the recall, and states where the unsafe product was distributed.  On 
the other hand, an RNR is issued in situations involving a Class III recall or, regardless of the class, 
when FSIS does not issue a recall release.10  Unlike a recall release, an RNR is not distributed to 
media wire services or media outlets in areas that received recalled products.  However, it is posted 
on the FSIS website.  Similarly, an RTR is issued when a recall is conducted by a retail 
                                                 
10 “FSIS will typically not issue a recall release for Class III recalls unless there are overriding public welfare reasons, 
such as a case of egregious economic adulteration” (FSIS Directive, 2013). 
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establishment under a State’s inspection program, and only if requested, FSIS will provide State 
agencies with assistance and information.11   
A total of 1,271 recalls have been issued during the period of interest of this study.  
However, not every firm involved in these recalls is publicly traded.  To identify public companies, 
online sources and financial software terminals were consulted.  First, an online search of the 
reported establishment issuing the recall was conducted to determine whether it was privately held, 
publicly held, or a subsidiary of a public company.  Then, the Bloomberg terminal was used to 
verify the ownership status of subsidiaries on the recall dates.  Here, public companies were 
screened to include only those traded in a U.S. stock exchange.  There were several cases where 
the involved establishment had not been yet acquired by the public company.  For example, 
Farmland Foods, a current subsidiary of Smithfield Foods Inc., issued a voluntary recall on May 
16, 2003.  However, it was not until October 28, 2003 that Smithfield completed the acquisition 
process of this establishment.  Thus, this recall and others in similar cases, were not included in 
the analysis.  Finally, the Bloomberg terminal was employed to determine the initial public 
offering date of each public company.  This search was conducted to verify whether the involved 
establishment was public at the time of the recall.  For instance, Kraft Foods Inc. became public 
on June 12, 2001.  However, the FSIS website reports recalls issued by Kraft that date back to 
1994.  As result, 163 recalls corresponding to 31 different publicly traded companies were 
identified.12   
                                                 
11 For consistency, recalls registered on RNR and RTR were excluded from this analysis.   
12 Six recalls from four companies that do not have enough trading data were excluded from this date set.  These four 
companies are: Cagle’s, Hanover Foods, Rymer Foods and Seneca Foods. 
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Table 4.1 summarizes the number and size of meat and poultry recalls by year.  From 1994 
to 2013, over 630 million pounds of product have been recalled.  Interestingly, recalls from 
publicly traded firms, which represent 13 percent of the recalls, account for almost 45 percent of 
the total number of pounds recalled during the past two decades (over 270 million pounds). 
Table 4.1.  Summary of All Recalls and Recalls from Publicly Traded Firms by Year 
Year All Recalls 
Recalls From Publicly Traded 
Firms 
 No. Pounds  No. Pounds  
1994 50 4,794,156  8 1,305,288  
1995 42 5,653,608  9 3,824,570  
1996 24 994,567  6 295,829  
1997 27 28,152,989  6 26,442,681  
1998 44 45,938,658  16 38,671,105  
1999 62 39,927,909  8 35,193,493  
2000 85 6,012,827  10 789,736  
2001 97 31,814,235  12 4,295,100  
2002 125 58,442,603  15 48,161,405  
2003 68 3,285,324  5 239,550  
2004 49 2,879,455  12 567,605  
2005 53 6,446,231  4 3,309,655  
2006 34 5,947,933  4 121,555  
2007 58 143,063,822  7 87,667,231  
2008 54 154,726,663  5 1,356,370  
2009 69 9,488,664  10 2,113,251  
2010 70 34,121,902  6 22,315,400  
2011 103 39,702,319  9 663,089  
2012 82 3,475,115  5 116,763  
2013 75 13,096,784  6 206,495  
Total 1,271 637,965,764  163 277,656,171  
 
The 163 meat and poultry recalls included in this analysis are very diverse.  These include 
beef, pork, chicken, turkey and other miscellaneous meat products.  In addition, recalls consist of 
a large selection of products ranging from mostly meat products (e.g., ground beef, sausage, etc.) 
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to products where meat is only one of the ingredients (e.g. pizza, soup, etc.).  Moreover, products 
recalled come in different package presentations and are sold raw, cooked or ready-to-eat.  
Regarding the recall classification based on the level of severity, the final data set contains 115 
Class I, 39 Class II and 9 Class III recalls (Table 4.2).  Not surprisingly, Class I recalls account for 
98 percent of the total product recalled, followed by Class II recalls with 1.4 percent and the 
remaining Class III recalls with less than 0.6 percent. 
Table 4.2.  Summary of Recalls from Publicly Traded Firms by Class  
Year Class I Class II Class III 
 No. Pounds No. Pounds No. Pounds 
1994 2 49,168 6 1,256,120 - - 
1995 7 3,364,625 2 459,945 - - 
1996 4 146,129 2 149,700 - - 
1997 4 26,316,034 2 126,647 - - 
1998 10 37,994,799 5 659,026 1 17,280 
1999 6 35,054,493 2 139,000 - - 
2000 9 788,200 1 1,536 - - 
2001 7 3,596,600 2 102,000 3 596,500 
2002 8 47,323,305 3 795,800 4 42,300 
2003 4 236,550 - - 1 3,000 
2004 12 567,605 - - - - 
2005 4 3,309,655 - - - - 
2006 2 18,277 2 103,278 - - 
2007 5 87,659,806 2 7,425 - - 
2008 4 1,305,010 1 51,360 - - 
2009 6 2,069,932 4 43,319 - - 
2010 6 22,315,400  - - - 
2011 8 652,829 1 10,260 - - 
2012 2 84,069 3 32,694 - - 
2013 5 168,495 1 38,000 - - 
Total 115 273,020,981 39 3,976,110 9 659,080 
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Focusing on recall size, Figure 4.1 depicts the natural logarithms of the size of each recall 
in chronological order.13  Here, it is shown that out of 163 recalls only 15 lie above the 13.8 mark 
(equivalent to 1 million pounds).  However, these recalls account for approximately 95 percent of 
the total product recalled.  Among these large scale recalls is one issued by ConAgra in 2007 
caused by Salmonella contamination in frozen pot pie products.  This recall is the largest of this 
data set with about 84 million pounds recalled.  The second and third largest recalls were issued 
by Bil Mar Foods (a subsidiary of Sara Lee) in 1998 and Thorn Apple Valley in 1999, and were 
caused by a Listeria monocytogenes outbreak in hot dogs and frankfurters, respectively.  Each 
company issued a recall of 35 million pounds.  Not surprisingly, these three largest recalls are 
Class I and were caused by a foodborne pathogen outbreak.  On the other hand, 101 recalls lie 
below the 11.5 mark (equivalent to 100,000 pounds). 
                                                 
13 To facilitate the analysis of this figure, recall size is expressed as the natural logarithms of the number of pounds 
recalled. 
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Figure 4.1  Recall Size per Recall 
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Table 4.3 summarizes the number of recalls by firm.  These firms differ in size and level 
of diversification.  In addition, their stocks are traded in either the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) or NASDAQ Stock Market (with the exception of Nestle which trades on an OTC market). 
Table 4.3.  Summary of Recalls from Publicly Traded Firms by Firm 
Ticker Company No. Pounds 
AHP American Home Products Corp. 1                     150,000  
BOBE Bob Evans Farms Inc. 1                          8,500  
CAG ConAgra Inc. 24             114,669,426  
COST Costco Wholesale Corp. 4                     222,123  
CPB Campbell Soup Co. 9               16,322,137  
DEG The Delhaize Group 1 Undetermined 
DLM Del Monte Foods Co. 1                       31,650  
GIS General Mills Inc. 1                 3,300,000  
HAIN The Hain Celestial Group Inc. 1                     983,700  
HFI Hudson Foods Inc. 5               28,313,959  
HNZ Heinz H. J. Co. 3                       94,886  
HRL Hormel Foods Corp. 6                     234,946  
IBP IBP Inc. 5                 1,160,355  
K Kellogg Co. 1                          2,790  
KFT Kraft Foods Inc. 5                       28,508  
KR Kroger Co. 3                     490,131  
NSRGY Nestle SA 13                 1,689,393  
PPC Pilgrim’s Pride Corp. 4               28,806,600  
SAFM Sanderson Farms Inc. 1 Undetermined 
SFD Smithfield Foods Inc. 13                 1,007,821  
SJM Smucker J. M. Co. 1                          3,000  
SLE Sara Lee Corp. 13               37,723,229  
SVU Supervalu Inc. 2                             962  
SYY Sysco Corp. 1                       16,800  
TAVI Thorn Apple Valley Inc. 2               35,009,936  
THS TreeHouse Foods Inc. 3                     214,957  
TSN Tyson Foods Inc. 35                 4,854,233  
UVV Universal Corp. 1                     578,000  
WFM Whole Foods Market Inc. 1                          1,275  
WIN Winn Dixie Stores Inc. 1                 1,734,002  
WMK Weis Markets Inc. 1                          2,852  
Total  163             277,656,171  
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Three of these companies (CAG, SLE and TAVI) are responsible for almost 70 percent of 
the recalled product, whereas two (CAG and TSN) are responsible for 36 percent of the recalls.  
Also, the company with the largest number of recalls, Tyson Foods, is not the one recalling the 
largest amount of product.  On a different aspect, some recalls are issued by a subsidiary of the 
“parent” companies (not distinguished in table 4.3).  This is the case of 57 recalls (35 percent of 
the recalls). 
 4.2 Stock and Firm Data 
Daily stock price data were obtained from the Bloomberg terminal.  Regardless of the recall 
date, these data were collected for the entire period of this study (January, 1994 to December 
2013).  Then, the event timeline was established as in Figure 3.1.14  Similarly, daily market index 
price data were collected for the following six indices: Standard and Poor’s 500 Composite Index 
(S&P 500); S&P 500 Food, Beverage and Tobacco Industry Group Index (S&P 500 FBT); S&P 
500 Packaged Foods Industry Index (S&P 500 PF); NASDAQ Global Select Market Composite 
(NQGS); New York Stock Exchange Composite Index (NYA); and Russell 2000 Index (RTY).  
That is, consistent with the literature, the S&P 500 indices are used to estimate the benchmark 
model.  However, other indices are also included to account for stocks traded in NASDAQ and in 
the NYSE (i.e., NQGS and NYA, respectively), and for small capitalization stocks (i.e., RTY).  
Furthermore, the Bloomberg terminal was also used to collect daily trading volume for each firm.   
Firm size is one of the variables included in this analysis and market equity is used as its 
proxy.  Market equity is calculated as the product between the closing stock price (10 trading days 
                                                 
14 If the recall date fell on a weekend or holiday, the event date was defined as the nearest trading day following the 
announcement date. 
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before the recall announcement) and the total number of shares outstanding.  The number of shares 
was collected from annual reports (or 10-K reports) which are publically available at the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission website (SEC-EDGAR search tools).  Particular attention 
was paid to ensure the recall date coincided with the report prepared on the corresponding fiscal 
year.  Additionally, information regarding the diversification level of each firm was also gathered 
from annual reports.  Ideally, this variable would have been constructed using the percentage of 
sales (or production) involving meat and poultry products.  However, since not every firm reports 
the percentage of sales per product segment, a very broad variable was used instead reflecting 
whether meat and poultry products are one of the main lines of production in each firm.  For 
example, meat is the main production/sales segment for Smithfield Foods, whereas for Kellogg, 
meat is a very small segment.  In addition, for all firms in the sample, this broad level of 
diversification did not vary by year. 
 4.3 Media Data 
Media information, more specifically the number of articles published per day, were 
collected using LexisNexis Academic.  This search was conducted per recall, over the event 
window dates.  That is, 15 calendar days prior and 30 calendar days after the recall announcement 
(corresponding to [–10, +20] trading days).  Additionally, the selected source type included “all 
news” sources (e.g., newspapers, newswires and press releases, web-based publications, blogs, 
newsletters, news transcripts, magazines, etc.), covering the entire U.S. region.  The keywords 
used in each search were recall specific, including: {“product recalled” AND recall}, {“cause” 
AND recall}, {“product” AND “cause” AND recall}, or {“product recalled” AND “cause”}.  To 
ensure the articles were related to a specific recall, a within search was then performed using the 
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“establishment’s name” as a keyword.  For example, keywords for one of the entries would be: 
{ground beef AND E. coli AND recall} and then, the within search would include: ConAgra. 
In some cases, individual searches resulted in duplicated articles.  To deal with this issue 
several rules were defined: 
i. Two articles, published on the same day by the same periodical on different feeds are 
considered one article. 
ii. Two articles, published on the same day by the same periodical on different times are 
considered one article. 
iii. The same article, published by two different periodicals on the same day is considered 
two articles. 
iv. The same article, published by the same periodical on different dates is considered two 
articles. 
v. One article, making reference to two different recalls is counted twice, once for each 
recall. 
Figure 4.2 depicts the total number of articles per recall (in chronological order).  In 
general, it is noticeable the increase in the number of articles through time.  Removing the three 
outliers from the first half of the sample, the number of articles almost doubled in the last decade.  
Furthermore, zero articles were published regarding 30 out of 163 recalls.  This is the case of 
recalls that occurred during the 1990’s with few exceptions.  On the other hand, three recalls 
present a number of articles above 100.  These recalls were issued by Hudson Foods in 1997 (412 
articles), ConAgra in 2002 (190 articles) and Pilgrim’s Pride in 2002 (122 articles).  The common 
denominator of the three recalls is that these are Class I, caused by contamination with a foodborne 
pathogen (E. coli O157:H7 in the first two and Listeria monocytogenes in the last), and exceeded 
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18 million pounds of product recalled.  In particular, the case of Hudson Foods received 
widespread media attention because at that time, it was considered the largest beef recall in history, 
and also because the tainted product (hamburger patties) had been sold to Burger King.  
In addition, Figure 4.3 presents a comparison between recall size (expressed in natural 
logarithms of the number of pounds recalled) and the number of articles issued per recall.  The 
number of articles seems to be proportional to the size of the recall in most of the cases.  In 
particular, recalls with the largest number of pounds recalled, also have the largest number of 
articles issued. 
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Figure 4.2  Number of Articles per Recall 
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Figure 4.3  Comparison of Recall Size versus Number of Articles per Recall 
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 4.4 Summary Statistics 
Table 4.4 presents a description and summary statistics of the explanatory variables used 
to determine post event abnormal returns.  Some of these statistics were already discussed in 
previous sections.   
Table 4.4.  Description and Summary Statistics of Explanatory Variables 
Variable Description Statistics 
  Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Recall Size No. of pounds recalled (natural log) 10.64 2.58 4.17 18.25 
Firm Size Market equity (natural log) 22.15 1.47 16.73 26.10 
Momentum Return over previous 12 months (%) 11.44 29.83 -85.21 116.60 
Initial Shock Return on the event day 0 (%) 0.00 1.97 -4.75 9.63 
Trading Volume Percentage of shares outstanding 
that is traded a 
10.89 13.59 0.24 138.70 
Media Index No. of articles a 14.37 38.50 0.00 412.00 
  No. % Freq   
Class      
Class I 1 if Class I, 0 otherwise 115 70.55   
Class II 1 if Class II, 0 otherwise 39 23.93   
Class III 1 if Class III, 0 otherwise 9 5.52   
Pathogen 1 if recall was caused by a pathogen, 
0 otherwise 
54 33.13   
Experience 1 if the specific firm had another 
recall in the past year, 0 otherwise 
75 46.01   
Diversification 1 if meat is the main segment, 0 
otherwise 
86 52.76   
HACCP 1 if recall occurred after HACCP 
implementation, 0 otherwise 
144 88.34   
Subsidiary 1 if subsidiary, 0 otherwise 57 34.97   
Cluster 1 if any firm had other recall that 
occurred within the last 10 days, 0 
otherwise 
46 28.22   
a  Overall statistics over the event window interval [0, +20] days. 
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Focusing on Firm Size, the firm with the largest market value of equity in this sample is 
Nestle (almost $216 billion), whereas the smallest is Thorn Apple Valley ($18.5 million).  In 
addition, for the average firm the value of market equity is $4 billion.  On the other hand, looking 
at Momentum, the firm with the largest annual return over the year previous to the recall is 
Sanderson Farms (116.6 % return in 2001), whereas the smallest is Pilgrim’s Pride which in 2009 
had a negative return of 85.2 %.  In this latter case, the company had filed for bankruptcy at the 
end of 2008.   
Furthermore, daily data were collected for: Trading Volume and Media Index over the 
event window.  Therefore, these are the only two explanatory variables that vary over time (the 
statistics presented in Table 4.4 are based on the aggregation of these variables over the interval 
[0, +20] of the event window).  To provide a more detailed description of these variables through 
time, Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5 show the average percentage of shares outstanding traded and the 
average number of articles per recall over the event window, respectively.  Note that figure 4.4 
represents the average volume (specified as a percentage of shares outstanding) traded across all 
recalls.  Although some firms trade more than 5 percent of their shares outstanding every day, 
most of them only trade less than 1 percent.  Therefore, the average trading volume does not exceed 
1 percent. 
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Figure 4.4  Average Percentage of Shares Outstanding Traded per Recall 
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Figure 4.5  Average Number of Articles per Recall 
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Chapter 5 - Results and Discussion 
This chapter is divided in three subsections.  The first subsection presents results from the 
estimation of 𝐴𝑅.  Here, two estimation windows [𝑇1 + 1, 𝑇2] are considered to account for the 
sensitivity of results to the choice of sampling periods: one equal to [–260, –11] and the other equal 
to [–255, –6] trading days.  For simplicity, results obtained from benchmark models estimated with 
observations from the first estimation window are referred to as w1, whereas those from the second 
window are referred to as w2.15  This notation is extended all the way to the estimation of abnormal 
returns and its aggregations.  In the second subsection, results from the prediction of 𝐴𝑅s and 
𝐶𝐴𝑅s, using recall specific and control variables, are discussed.  Lastly, simulation examples based 
on obtained findings are presented in the third subsection. 
 5.1 Abnormal Returns Estimation 
Before estimating the market model in equation (6) or the ARDL model in equation (9), 
preliminary analysis of the time series properties of stock returns was conducted.  Here, returns 
are expected to follow a stationary process.  Therefore, unit root tests were applied to stock returns 
on the estimation window.  Results from the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test indicate that 
all stock return series are stationary at the 0.05 significance level.16 
In the estimation of the market model, AIC was used to select the best market index among 
the six indices available.  Then, the Ljung-Box test was applied to test for serial correlation among 
                                                 
15 The comparison of these results is important because it is assumed that the predictive power of models estimated 
using 𝑤2 observations is higher (shorter forecasting horizon).   
16 The ADF tests were applied using both a trend and a drift as deterministic components, with a maximum of 21 lags 
allowed.  In addition, the Akaike information criterion (AIC) was used for lag selection. 
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residuals.  If serial correlation was present in a particular market model, the ARDL(1) model was 
estimated instead.  Thus, a total of 163 × 2 different benchmark models (one for each meat recall 
multiplied by two estimation windows) were estimated.  Among these, 87 and 89 correspond to 
the market model and 76 and 74 to the ARDL model, for 𝑤1 and  𝑤2, respectively.  A summary 
of the regression results from the benchmark models is reported in Table 5.1.  As expected, the 
estimates of 𝛼 are not statistically different from zero (0.05 significance level), with few exceptions 
(7 cases out of 326).  In addition, all estimates of 𝛽 are positive, indicating a positive relationship 
between individual stock returns and the selected market index.  All 𝛽 coefficients are statistically 
significant (0.05 significance level), except in three cases.  Also, consistent with previous event 
study literature using daily stock price returns, adjusted R2 values are low (0.25 on average across 
all benchmark models).  This simply reflects the fact that individual company stock returns vary 
relative to benchmarks. 
Table 5.1.  Summary Statistics of Coefficients from Benchmark Models 
Coefficients 𝒘𝟏 Models 𝒘𝟐 Models 
 Mean Median Min Max Mean Median Min Max 
Market Model         
𝛼 0.033 0.031 -0.599 0.300 0.040 0.038 -0.091 0.301 
𝛽 0.831 0.804 0.162 1.466 0.830 0.802 0.172 1.439 
ARDL Model         
𝛼 0.019 0.009 -0.342 0.465 0.009 0.011 -0.741 0.543 
𝛽 0.806 0.811 0.236 1.868 0.804 0.822 0.197 1.877 
𝛾 0.077 0.100 -0.561 0.843 0.085 0.121 -0.557 0.830 
𝛿 -0.086 -0.118 -0.303 0.238 -0.092 -0.117 -0.325 0.241 
 
Once abnormal returns are calculated by taking the difference between expected normal 
returns (predicted using the benchmark models) and actual returns, they are aggregated over time 
intervals of the event window and across events to obtain overall measures of the impact of a meat 
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recall.  Table 5.2 reports cumulative average abnormal returns (𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅) for all recalls, 
corresponding to w1, along with t-statistics from parametric (equation 18) and nonparametric 
(equation 25) tests. Regardless of the interval, 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 are non-negative at time 𝑡 = 0.  Thus, 
suggesting that on average the stock market does not react immediately to every recall.  It takes 
from 1 to 3 days after the recall announcement for the stock market to react.  This in itself is not 
surprising because the recall may not be announced until after the market closes.  However, these 
responses do not become statistically significant until day 4, with one exception.  Also, note that 
both t-statics are consistent (provide the same results) in the last three intervals.  By day 5, all 
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 are negative and statistically significant in all intervals.  Here, results suggest that on 
average stock returns decreased up to 0.6% within five days after the recall announcement.  This 
is not the case, however for intervals ending at days 10 or 15 (𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 are not significant).  
Surprisingly, 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 become more negative and significant at day 20, indicating that on average 
stock returns decreased up to 1% within twenty days after the recall.  Figure 5.1 helps to illustrate 
these findings by showing 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 plotted over different intervals of the event window.17  The 
magnitude of 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 is influenced by the starting point of aggregation.  In addition, most adverse 
stock price movements occur within five trading days after the event day and then, after recovering 
for a short time, these decrease again on days 18 to 20 and bounce back up afterward.  Table 5.3 
shows 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 for all recalls, corresponding to w2, along with t-statistics. As expected, some of the 
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 measures that were not statistically significant in w1, become significant in w2.  Also, 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 
are slightly larger (in absolute value) in w2.  Figure 5.2 demonstrates this.  For example, the line 
                                                 
17 Event window intervals are extended with the purpose of analyzing 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 responses beyond 20 days after the recall 
announcement.  Also, results from the interval [1, 30] are not shown because these are very similar to those in interval 
[0, 30]. 
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showing the behavior of  𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 on interval [-5, 30] is slightly below the one in Figure 5.1.  Thus, 
in general, evidence indicates there are slight differences between results from w1 and w2.  That 
is, results show some variation depending on the selection of estimation window.  However, at this 
point it is not possible to assess which results are better. 
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Table 5.2.  Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns [w1], All Recalls  
 𝜏1 = −10 𝜏1 = −5 𝜏1 = −2 
𝜏2 CAAR 𝑍𝐵𝑀𝑃 𝑍𝐺𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾 CAAR 𝑍𝐵𝑀𝑃 𝑍𝐺𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾 CAAR 𝑍𝐵𝑀𝑃 𝑍𝐺𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾 
-10 -0.059 -0.483 0.515       
-5 0.084 -0.366 0.083 0.192 0.713 0.329    
-1 0.242 -0.536 -0.534 0.350 -0.029 0.575 0.053 -0.735 -0.280 
0 0.243 -0.588 -0.633 0.350 -0.102 0.156 0.053 -0.676 -0.989 
1 0.152 -0.735 -0.766 0.259 -0.337 0.081 -0.038 -0.898 -1.057 
2 0.145 -0.623 -0.546 0.252 -0.197 0.503 -0.044 -0.669 -0.925 
3 -0.045 -0.882 -0.156 0.062 -0.546 0.401 -0.234 -1.010 -1.063 
4 -0.263    -1.397** -0.606 -0.156 -1.168 -0.374 -0.453    -1.685**    -1.684** 
5 -0.369    -1.606** -0.940 -0.262    -1.402** -0.702 -0.558    -1.920**    -2.020** 
10 -0.052 -1.102 -0.777 0.055 -0.844 -0.553 -0.241 -1.194    -1.370** 
15 -0.084 -1.059 -1.106 0.023 -0.861 -0.699 -0.274 -1.108 -1.173 
20 -0.764    -1.524**    -1.542** -0.656    -1.380** -1.248 -0.953    -1.561**    -1.618** 
 𝜏1 = 0 𝜏1 = 1    
𝜏2 CAAR 𝑍𝐵𝑀𝑃 𝑍𝐺𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾 CAAR 𝑍𝐵𝑀𝑃 𝑍𝐺𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾    
-10          
-5          
-1          
0 0.000 -0.181 -0.233       
1 -0.091 -0.594 -0.841 -0.091 -0.565 -0.671    
2 -0.097 -0.295 -0.275 -0.098 -0.198 0.088    
3 -0.287 -0.800 -0.522 -0.288 -0.754 -0.268    
4 -0.506    -1.697**    -1.656** -0.506    -1.726**    -1.410**    
5 -0.611    -1.931**    -2.017** -0.612    -1.933**    -1.782**    
10 -0.294 -0.975 -1.069 -0.295 -0.978 -0.981    
15 -0.327 -0.941 -0.996 -0.327 -0.936 -0.969    
20 -1.006    -1.446**    -1.572** -1.007    -1.472**    -1.485**    
Note: ** and * denote statistical significance at the 0.05 and 0.10 level for a one tailed test (equation 12).   
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Figure 5.1  Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns [w1] for All Recalls 
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Table 5.3.  Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns [w2], All Recalls 
  𝜏1 = −5 𝜏1 = −2 𝜏1 = 0 
𝜏2 CAAR 𝑍𝐵𝑀𝑃 𝑍𝐺𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾 CAAR 𝑍𝐵𝑀𝑃 𝑍𝐺𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾 CAAR 𝑍𝐵𝑀𝑃 𝑍𝐺𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾 
          
-5 0.167 0.577 0.288       
-1 0.326 -0.061 0.502 0.048 -0.668 -0.242    
0 0.315 -0.238 -0.039 0.036 -0.756 -1.001 -0.011 -0.409 -0.424 
1 0.223 -0.479 -0.039 -0.056 -0.986 -1.112 -0.103 -0.797 -1.072 
2 0.230 -0.306 0.380 -0.049 -0.721 -0.958 -0.097 -0.429 -0.460 
3 0.034 -0.629 0.338 -0.244 -1.047 -1.038 -0.292 -0.888 -0.584 
4 -0.191    -1.302** -0.571 -0.469    -1.787**    -1.804** -0.517    -1.870**    -1.828** 
5 -0.305    -1.539** -0.889 -0.583    -2.030**    -2.171** -0.631    -2.091**    -2.248** 
10 -0.012 -1.020 -0.729 -0.290    -1.342**    -1.545** -0.338 -1.162    -1.309** 
15 -0.046 -1.005 -0.789 -0.324 -1.230 -1.273 -0.372 -1.087 -1.147 
20 -0.725    -1.490**    -1.333** -1.003    -1.648**    -1.690** -1.051    -1.550**    -1.669** 
 𝜏1 = 1 
𝜏2 CAAR 𝑍𝐵𝑀𝑃 𝑍𝐺𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾 
    
-5    
-1    
0    
1 -0.092 -0.608 -0.757 
2 -0.085 -0.181 0.076 
3 -0.281 -0.733 -0.217 
4 -0.506    -1.799**    -1.499** 
5 -0.620    -2.013**    -1.968** 
10 -0.327 -1.095 -1.162 
15 -0.361 -1.028 -1.113 
20 -1.040    -1.527**    -1.472** 
Note: ** and * denote statistical significance at the 0.05 and 0.10 level for a one tailed test (equation 12).   
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Figure 5.2  Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns [w2] for All Recalls 
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Thomsen and McKenzie (2001), found significantly negative 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 at day 20 as well.18  
To verify if this finding is caused by outliers, individual 𝐶𝐴𝑅 are analyzed by looking at their 
behavior over time.   This evaluation is also conducted as a robustness check.  Figure 5.3 shows 
plots of individual 𝐶𝐴𝑅 on different horizons over interval [0, 30] trading days of the event 
window.  Each circle represents an individual recall which always maintains the same order.  
Looking at the plots, it is evident that there are few outliers (or influential observations) on both 
sides of 𝐶𝐴𝑅.  In particular, recall 124 is the most noticeable because its return consistently 
decreases reaching -157%.  To know precisely which recalls are outliers, sorting tools were applied 
on each horizon. The three recalls that appeared more frequently on the last ten positions of 
negative returns are:  Thorn Apple Valley (1999), Pilgrim’s Pride (2002) and Pilgrim’s Pride 
(2009).  In these three cases, the range of 𝐶𝐴𝑅 variation across all horizons is -157 to -12%.  In 
addition, these recalls are Class I and resulted in 64 million pounds of product recalled overall.  
Thorn Apple Valley filed for bankruptcy right after this recall, whereas Pilgrim’s Pride had already 
done so prior to its 2009 recall.  On the other hand, the recalls that appear more frequently on the 
first ten positions of positive returns are: Tyson Foods (2002), Smithfield Foods (2000) and 
Sanderson Farms (2001).  Here, the range of 𝐶𝐴𝑅 variation across all intervals is 7 to 27%.  The 
first two are Class I recalls and the last is Class III, with 12,000 pound of product recalled overall. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 The authors, however, did not provide an explanation for this unexpected behavior. 
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Figure 5.3  Cumulative Abnormal Returns for All Recalls over Interval [0, 30] Days 
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To further analyze the influence of outliers on 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 for all recalls, they were calculated 
without including their corresponding 𝐶𝐴𝑅 observations.  Figure 5.4 illustrate the results of this 
comparison over interval [0, 30] trading days.  Here, the first plot summarizes the original results 
of the 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 estimation, the second and third removes three negative and three positive 𝐶𝐴𝑅, 
respectively and the fourth, shows 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 results when both negative and positive outliers are 
removed (six total). 
 
Figure 5.4  Influence of Outliers on CAAR over Interval [0, 30] Days 
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Looking at this figure, the influence of both negative and positive outliers becomes evident.  
That is, by removing negative outliers, the 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 plot shifts upwards.  In particular, the return over 
day 20 increases from -1 to -0.6%.  The opposite occurs when positive outliers are removed.  It is 
interesting to observe that the original and last plot (without the six outliers) are fairly similar up 
to day 20.  From there, returns start increasing consistently in the last plot, when negative outliers 
are removed.  Thus, indicating that returns start going back to pre-event levels after day 20.  Unlike 
Thomsen and McKenzie (2001), results from this study suggest that shareholder losses are not 
persistent.  Furthermore, since there are no marked differences between the original and the last 
plot, it can be concluded that factors other than outlier observations (not know at this point) 
influence the behavior of 𝐶𝐴𝑅.   
 5.1.1 Analysis of CAAR by Recall Class 
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 are analyzed separately according to their recall classification.  Here, it is assumed 
that Class I recalls have a more adverse impact in stock prices compared to the other two classes.  
Table 5.4 shows 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 computed for Class I recalls, based on w1.  In contrast to the previous 
tables, 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 become negative at day 𝑡 = -2.  However, they are not significant until day zero 
(interval [-2, +20] days).  As expected, the reaction of stock prices is larger (in absolute value) for 
this type of recalls.  For example, at day 5, stock returns decreased on average from 0.89 to 1.02% 
after a Class I recall.  Also, the level of statistical significance of 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 increases in every interval.  
For instance, all 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 from day 0 to 20 are significant in interval [-2, +20] days.   Figure 5.5 
shows the plots of Class I 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 over different intervals, based on w1.  Interestingly, these plots 
follow a similar pattern of those in Thomsen and McKenzie (2001).  However, differences exist 
regarding the magnitude of 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅.  For example, in their study the magnitude of 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 following 
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day six is within the range of 1.5 to 3% decrease.  In this analysis, however, the maximum 
percentage decrease following day six is 1.25%.  Moreover, results provide little evidence that 
stock markets become aware of a recall prior to the official announcement date.  This was not the 
case in Thomsen and McKenzie (2001), where stock markets started reacting a few days before 
FSIS issued a recall release.  These differences in findings are most likely related to the time 
periods considered for analysis. 
Results for Class II recalls are reported in Table 5.5.  Unlike results associated with Class 
I recalls, 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 are mostly positive.  Here, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 are 
greater or equal to zero in all cases.  To check if 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 are strictly positive, a two tailed test was 
used instead.  Results indicate that in few cases, stock returns experience increases after a Class II 
recall.  These findings are consistent with Thomsen and McKenzie (2001).  The authors argue that 
a possible explanation for these results is that stock markets only react adversely to Class I recalls 
because of the health risk involved.  Considering that direct costs associated with both types of 
recalls are similar, the main difference is that Class I recalls affect the profitability of the firm by 
reducing the firm’s revenues.  Since revenues are affected by consumers’ and customers’ 
responses, this suggests that stock markets react to negative impacts on the demand side. 
Table 5.6 report results from Class III recalls.  Similarly to those for Class II recalls, 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 
are positive, with some exceptions.  However, t-statistics indicate that all except one (day 2 on 
interval [+1, +20] days), are equal to zero.  Results from the analysis of 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 by recall class, are 
very similar to those based on w2 (Appendix A).  The only difference is that the magnitude of 
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 based on w2 are relatively smaller (in absolute value) for Class II and III recalls. 
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Table 5.4.  Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns [w1], Class I Recalls 
 𝜏1 = −10 𝜏1 = −5 𝜏1 = −2 
𝜏2 CAAR 𝑍𝐵𝑀𝑃 𝑍𝐺𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾 CAAR 𝑍𝐵𝑀𝑃 𝑍𝐺𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾 CAAR 𝑍𝐵𝑀𝑃 𝑍𝐺𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾 
-10 -0.132 -0.376 0.258       
-5 0.197 -0.291 -0.165 0.231 0.552 0.020    
-1 0.263 -0.435 -0.970 0.296 -0.023 0.136 -0.101 -0.611 -0.561 
0 0.191 -0.462 -1.176 0.224 -0.080 -0.267 -0.173 -0.580    -1.323** 
1 0.001 -0.578    -1.342** 0.034 -0.263 -0.489 -0.363 -0.735    -1.557** 
2 -0.116 -0.496    -1.303** -0.083 -0.155 -0.388 -0.480 -0.543    -1.769** 
3 -0.423 -0.693 -1.019 -0.390 -0.427 -0.425 -0.787 -0.811    -1.977** 
4 -0.801 -1.115    -1.729** -0.768 -0.939    -1.426** -1.165    -1.385**    -2.770** 
5 -0.892    -1.310**    -1.845** -0.859 -1.164    -1.489** -1.256    -1.622**    -2.816** 
10 -0.832 -0.875    -2.102** -0.798 -0.686    -1.943** -1.195 -0.986    -2.856** 
15 -0.649 -0.845    -1.642** -0.616 -0.701    -1.362** -1.013 -0.904    -1.833** 
20 -1.379 -1.220    -1.918** -1.346 -1.138    -1.658** -1.743    -1.292**    -2.077** 
 𝜏1 = 0 𝜏1 = 1    
𝜏2 CAAR 𝑍𝐵𝑀𝑃 𝑍𝐺𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾 CAAR 𝑍𝐵𝑀𝑃 𝑍𝐺𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾    
-10          
-5          
-1          
0 -0.072 -0.164 -0.640       
1 -0.262 -0.505 -1.091 -0.190 -0.461 -1.065    
2 -0.379 -0.241 -1.074 -0.307 -0.155 -0.865    
3 -0.686 -0.630    -1.489** -0.613 -0.579 -1.165    
4 -1.064    -1.394**    -2.703** -0.992    -1.398**    -2.484**    
5 -1.155    -1.673**    -2.635** -1.083    -1.635**    -2.296**    
10 -1.094 -0.797    -2.299** -1.022 -0.786    -2.233**    
15 -0.912 -0.761    -1.457** -0.839 -0.753    -1.332**    
20 -1.642 -1.194    -1.927** -1.570 -1.201    -1.777**    
Note: ** and * denote statistical significance at the 0.05 and 0.10 level for a one tailed test (equation 12).   
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Figure 5.5  Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns [w1] for Class I Recalls 
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Table 5.5.  Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns [w1], Class II Recalls  
 𝜏1 = −10 𝜏1 = −5 𝜏1 = −2 
𝜏2 CAAR 𝑍𝐵𝑀𝑃 𝑍𝐺𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾 CAAR 𝑍𝐵𝑀𝑃 𝑍𝐺𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾 CAAR 𝑍𝐵𝑀𝑃 𝑍𝐺𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾 
-10 0.069 -0.283 0.321       
-5 -0.048 -0.211 0.054 0.161 0.400 0.584    
-1 0.476 -0.266 0.403 0.684 -0.014 0.921 0.597 -0.319 0.469 
0 0.636 -0.346 0.698 0.845 -0.055 0.826 0.758 -0.282 0.556 
1 0.576 -0.438 0.601 0.784 -0.191 0.740 0.697 -0.448 0.426 
2 0.830 -0.336 0.869 1.039 -0.104 1.210 0.951 -0.325 1.084 
3 1.101 -0.477 1.250 1.310 -0.285 1.312 1.222 -0.491 1.246 
4 1.248 -0.706 1.444 1.456 -0.544 1.362 1.369 -0.744 1.214 
5 0.919 -0.755 0.946 1.128 -0.607 0.779 1.041 -0.799 0.623 
10 1.892 -0.574 1.570 2.101 -0.393  1.663* 2.013 -0.535  1.766* 
15 1.520 -0.529 0.569 1.728 -0.397 0.850 1.641 -0.509 0.852 
20 0.485 -0.741 -0.110 0.693 -0.613 0.095 0.606 -0.687 0.215 
 𝜏1 = 0 𝜏1 = 1    
𝜏2 CAAR 𝑍𝐵𝑀𝑃 𝑍𝐺𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾 CAAR 𝑍𝐵𝑀𝑃 𝑍𝐺𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾    
-10          
-5          
-1          
0 0.161 -0.069 0.591       
1 0.100 -0.276 -0.138 -0.061 -0.301 -0.189    
2 0.354 -0.149 0.837 0.194 -0.111 0.734    
3 0.625 -0.421 1.293 0.465 -0.439 1.086    
4 0.772 -0.762 0.977 0.611 -0.796 0.994    
5 0.444 -0.777 0.153 0.283 -0.802 -0.080    
10 1.416 -0.455 1.231 1.255 -0.486 1.147    
15 1.044 -0.447 0.437 0.883 -0.455 0.244    
20 0.009 -0.647 -0.076 -0.152 -0.681 -0.240    
Note: * denotes statistical significance at the 0.10 level for two tailed test (𝐻0: 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 = 0 and 𝐻𝑎: 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 ≠ 0).   
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Table 5.6.  Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns [w1], Class III Recalls 
 𝜏1 = −10 𝜏1 = −5 𝜏1 = −2 
𝜏2 CAAR 𝑍𝐵𝑀𝑃 𝑍𝐺𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾 CAAR 𝑍𝐵𝑀𝑃 𝑍𝐺𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾 CAAR 𝑍𝐵𝑀𝑃 𝑍𝐺𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾 
-10 0.327 -0.147 0.502       
-5 -0.793 -0.088 0.830 -0.173 0.290 -0.007    
-1 -1.030 -0.146 0.387 -0.410 -0.015 -0.151 -0.337 -0.274 -0.185 
0 -0.795 -0.154 0.050 -0.175 -0.037 -0.228 -0.102 -0.191 -0.589 
1 0.242 -0.186 0.310 0.862 -0.104 0.459 0.935 -0.220 0.262 
2 0.517 -0.173 0.493 1.137 -0.071 0.810 1.210 -0.204 0.099 
3 -0.185 -0.301 0.252 0.435 -0.280 0.291 0.508 -0.372 -0.094 
4 0.060 -0.471 0.493 0.680 -0.606 0.555 0.754 -0.729 0.195 
5 0.731 -0.521 0.618 1.351 -0.561 0.714 1.424 -0.716 0.295 
10 1.486 -0.355 0.829 2.106 -0.309 0.992 2.179 -0.409 0.574 
15 0.178 -0.379 0.041 0.798 -0.325 0.108 0.872 -0.407 -0.190 
20 1.689 -0.594 0.743 2.309 -0.518 0.574 2.382 -0.577 0.262 
 𝜏1 = 0 𝜏1 = 1    
𝜏2 CAAR 𝑍𝐵𝑀𝑃 𝑍𝐺𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾 CAAR 𝑍𝐵𝑀𝑃 𝑍𝐺𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾    
-10          
-5          
-1          
0 0.235 -0.045 0.026       
1 1.272 -0.126 0.753 1.037 -0.123 1.485    
2 1.547 -0.073 0.873 1.312 -0.065  1.869*    
3 0.845 -0.293 0.315 0.610 -0.334 0.675    
4 1.090 -0.644 0.608 0.855 -0.779 0.819    
5 1.761 -0.593 0.733 1.526 -0.717 1.031    
10 2.516 -0.316 1.060 2.281 -0.316 1.378    
15 1.209 -0.342 0.132 0.974 -0.333 0.224    
20 2.719 -0.498 0.574 2.484 -0.515 0.767    
Note: * denotes statistical significance at the 0.10 level for two tailed test (𝐻0: 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 = 0 and 𝐻𝑎: 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 ≠ 0).   
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 5.1.2 Analysis of Shareholders’ Wealth after a Meat Recall 
This analysis is conducted by calculating the percentage of 𝐶𝐴𝑅 that are negative (or less 
than a negative threshold value) over intervals of the event window.  That is, this percentage 
represents the proportion of recalls that caused shareholder wealth losses.19  Table 5.7 reports 
results from this analysis based on all recalls and by recall class.20  Here, reported percentages are 
divided into two panels.  The first panel represents the percentage of 𝐶𝐴𝑅 that are negative, 
whereas the second represents the percentage of 𝐶𝐴𝑅 that are below -2 percent.  This distinction 
is useful because it allows distinguishing recalls according to their magnitude of impact.  For 
example, looking at results from all recalls in the first panel (interval [0, +20] days), it can be 
inferred that 54 percent of the recalls caused shareholder’s wealth losses on the event day.  
However, only 12 percent of the recalls caused losses greater than 2% (second panel).  On the 
other hand, comparing results across recall classes, on average, a higher percentage of Class I 
recalls result in negative returns (regardless of the threshold value).  This confirms that Class I 
recalls produce more severe effects on stock price returns than Class II.    
 
 
                                                 
19 This percentage is based on 163 recalls, without making the distinction that some firms had more than one recall 
during the period considered for analysis. 
20 Results from Class III recalls are not reported because this is a small sample (9 recalls). 
70 
 
Table 5.7.  Percentage of Recalls Causing Shareholders’ Wealth Losses 
 All Recalls  Class I Class II 
𝜏2  /  𝜏1 -10 -5 -2 0 1 -10 -5 -2 0 1 -10 -5 -2 0 1 
 < 0 % Returns 
-10 49.7     50.4     48.7     
-5 54.0 54.0    53.0 54.8    59.0 48.7    
-1 55.2 47.9 50.9   57.4 49.6 52.2   48.7 41.0 48.7   
0 54.0 50.9 56.4 54.0  59.1 52.2 59.1 57.4  43.6 46.2 46.2 46.2  
1 56.4 50.9 55.8 52.1 51.5 59.1 53.0 60.9 53.0 53.9 51.3 43.6 43.6 51.3 48.7 
2 57.1 48.5 59.5 50.9 47.2 61.7 53.0 65.2 52.2 50.4 46.2 35.9 43.6 48.7 43.6 
3 54.6 47.2 55.2 53.4 48.5 60.0 51.3 61.7 57.4 55.7 38.5 35.9 35.9 41.0 28.2 
4 52.8 50.9 56.4 58.3 52.8 59.1 57.4 63.5 64.3 58.3 35.9 35.9 38.5 43.6 38.5 
5 53.4 53.4 58.3 56.4 57.1 59.1 57.4 64.3 61.7 62.6 38.5 46.2 43.6 46.2 46.2 
10 52.8 54.0 57.7 56.4 55.2 58.3 60.0 64.3 60.9 60.0 41.0 41.0 38.5 48.7 48.7 
15 57.1 53.4 52.8 51.5 52.8 60.9 57.4 57.4 55.7 53.9 46.2 43.6 38.5 38.5 51.3 
20 53.4 53.4 54.6 55.2 54.0 55.7 53.9 58.3 57.4 58.3 51.3 51.3 46.2 51.3 46.2 
 < - 2% Returns 
-10 9.2     11.3     2.6     
-5 25.8 6.7    27.8 6.1    23.1 7.7    
-1 30.7 23.9 15.3   32.2 26.1 16.5   28.2 20.5 10.3   
0 30.1 22.7 21.5 12.3  33.9 25.2 21.7 13.0  17.9 15.4 15.4 10.3  
1 29.4 25.8 25.8 17.2 11.7 33.9 27.8 28.7 19.1 13.9 17.9 23.1 15.4 12.8 7.7 
2 31.9 26.4 28.8 20.2 14.1 34.8 29.6 31.3 22.6 16.5 23.1 20.5 23.1 15.4 10.3 
3 28.8 28.2 30.1 21.5 17.8 33.9 31.3 33.9 23.5 19.1 15.4 23.1 20.5 17.9 12.8 
4 33.7 33.7 35.0 28.2 25.2 38.3 37.4 38.3 30.4 28.7 20.5 25.6 28.2 25.6 20.5 
5 37.4 35.6 36.8 30.1 27.6 40.9 37.4 38.3 30.4 28.7 28.2 33.3 35.9 30.8 25.6 
10 41.7 38.7 38.7 32.5 33.1 48.7 46.1 45.2 40.0 40.0 23.1 23.1 25.6 15.4 15.4 
15 42.9 41.1 42.3 43.6 41.7 44.3 45.2 42.6 47.0 43.5 38.5 30.8 38.5 33.3 38.5 
20 45.4 44.8 46.0 45.4 42.3 49.6 47.0 49.6 48.7 45.2 38.5 41.0 38.5 38.5 38.5 
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 5.2 Estimation of the Effects of Meat and Poultry Recall Characteristics 
To examine the effects of meat recall characteristics on the magnitude of abnormal returns, 
either as individual (𝐴𝑅) or aggregated (𝐶𝐴𝑅) measures, both cross-sectional and panel data type 
models are estimated.  Since 𝐶𝐴𝑅 have been aggregated over several different intervals of the 
event study window, these models are estimated using observations from the interval [+1, +20] 
days.  This selection was based on two criteria: i) results from the analysis of 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 do not support 
the premise that stock markets react prior to the day of recall announcement; ii)  information 
regarding the timing when the recall release was issued is not available. This is important to 
determine when stock markets start to react.  That is, if a recall release was issued during early 
hours, stock markets would be able to react on the event day.  However, if it was issued during 
late hours of the day, stock markets would not be able to react until the following day.  Thus, for 
consistency, the event day observation is not included.  Furthermore, to evaluate the sensitivity of 
predicted effects over time, models are estimated using observations from the following horizons: 
[+1, +5], [+1, +10], [+1, +15], and [+1, +20] trading days.  Again, analyses are conducted 
contrasting w1 with w2.21 
 5.2.1 Results from Cross-Sectional Models 
 The dependent variable in these models is 𝐶𝐴𝑅 over horizons ranging from 5 to 20 days.  
In addition, explanatory variables remain fixed over time except for Trading Volume and Media 
Index which are aggregated over the corresponding horizon.  For instance, in the model estimated 
                                                 
21 Recall w1= [-260, -11] and w2 = [-255, -6]  trading days, are the estimation windows used to predict normal returns, 
which in turn are used to calculate abnormal returns.  Hence, this comparison is conducted to analyze the sensitivity 
of results to the choice of estimation window periods.  
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using observations from a 5-trading day horizon, Media Index is specified as the total number of 
articles issued from 1 to 5 days after the recall announcement.  Regardless of the horizon, all cross-
sectional models are estimated using the same number of observations. 
Table 5.8 presents results from the model estimated using observations from horizon 𝜏′ = 
[+1, +5].  According to this table, Experience and Initial Shock are the only two variables that help 
explain the variability of 𝐶𝐴𝑅s in this horizon.  However, regression diagnostics (analysis of 
variance inflation factors) detect the presence of multicollinearity on Class I and Class II variables. 
Table 5.8.  Results from Cross-Sectional Model for a 5-Trading Day Horizon [w1] 
Variable Coefficient t-Value 
Intercept -11.907  -1.251 
Class I -2.372  -1.502 
Class II -1.256  -0.750 
Recall Size -0.250  -1.407 
Firm Size 0.677  1.592 
Pathogen 0.562  0.652 
Experience        2.327  *** 3.138 
HACCP -0.676  -0.568 
Cluster 0.209  0.265 
Media Index -0.044  -1.416 
Momentum 0.024  1.442 
Diversification 0.529  0.643 
Initial Shock -0.425 * -1.913 
Trading Volume    0.012   0.091 
Subsidiary -0.073  -0.085 
Adjusted R2 0.149   
No. Observations b 159   
Notes: b four observations were deleted because recall size entries were undetermined. 
t-Values calculated using robust standard errors. 
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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To solve this issue, Class III observations are deleted from the sample (9 observations).  From an 
economic perspective, eliminating these observations is justified because Class III recalls do not 
cause adverse health consequences. Thus, it cannot be expected, for example, that these would 
have the same media impact as Class I or Class II recalls.  In addition, Class III recalls represent a 
small portion of the sample (5.5 percent). 
Table 5.9 reports results from cross-sectional models (for w1) estimated using observations 
from different post-event horizons, where Class III observations are excluded.  Comparing results 
from the 5-trading day horizon models, it can be observed that the adjusted R2 is greater in the 
model estimated without Class III observations.  This is also reflected on the significance of the 
coefficients, since more coefficients become significant in the latter model.  Also, the intercept 
becomes substantially more negative and the Class I coefficient increases, reflecting now the 
impact with respect to Class II recalls.  Other coefficients also change when Class III observations 
are excluded.  This is the case of Firm Size, HACCP, Cluster and Subsidiary (which switched its 
sign).   Based on this, it can be inferred that the presence of Class III observations affect coefficient 
stability, justifying the approach used for dealing with this issue. 
Looking at Table 5.9, in all models the intercept is negative as expected, and statistically 
significant only on the first horizon.  The coefficient of Class I is also negative in all models, 
indicating that on average Class I recalls have a larger (negative) impact on stock returns compared 
to Class II recalls.  Depending on the horizon this impact ranges from -0.838 to -1.682 percent.  
However, it is not statistically significant.  Recall Size is also negative in all horizons and 
statistically significant in the last three.  Also, the impact of this variable increases (in absolute 
value) as the horizon increases.  This finding indicates that on average a one unit increase in the 
size of a recall (equivalent to 170 percent increase in the number of pounds recalled for the average 
recall in this sample), causes abnormal returns to become more negative (ranging from -0.251 to -
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0.783 percent).  On the other hand, Firm Size is positive in all horizons and statistically significant 
only on the first.  This result indicates that on average larger firms experience lesser impacts after 
a recall.   More specifically, a one unit increase in the size of the firm (equivalent to 170 percent 
increase in the market value of equity for the average firm in this sample), causes abnormal returns 
to become less negative by approximately 1 percent within 5 days after the recall.  Furthermore, 
the coefficient of Pathogen is negative in all horizons except for the first.  Here, this coefficient 
indicates that recalls triggered by a foodborne pathogen have, on average, a larger (negative) 
impact on stock returns than those caused by other reasons (except in the first model which 
indicates the opposite).  However, regardless of the horizon this coefficient is not statistically 
significant.   
An interesting result is observed on the coefficient of Experience.  Besides being 
statistically significant in the first three horizons (almost in the fourth), this coefficient is positive 
and relatively large compared to those from other variables.  Contrary to a priori expectations that 
firms incurring in more than one recall within the past year would reflect more negative abnormal 
returns, this coefficient indicates the opposite.  That is, recurrent firms have on average a lessened 
impact after a recall.  These results are consistent with Salin and Hooker (2001).  A possible 
explanation for this finding is that investors take into consideration the past performance of a 
company when dealing with product recalls at the moment of making their valuations.  Thus, when 
a firm efficiently follows the protocols for managing a recall event and establishes clear 
communication channels with stakeholders, it actually sends a good signal to the stock market, 
indicating investors not to consider a new recall as a threat.    
The coefficient of HACCP is negative in all horizons and statistically significant only in 
the second.  This result indicates that firms incurring a recall after the implementation of mandatory 
HACCP regulations in 1996, experience on average about 3 percent decrease on shareholder’s 
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valuation within 10 days after the recall.  The number of recalls has increased since the HACCP 
implementation, so perhaps this coefficient reflects this new trend.  That is, the low incidence of 
recalls prior July 1996 causes on average a lesser impact on stock markets compared to the period 
after.  In addition, the coefficient of Cluster has different signs depending on the horizon and is 
not statistically significant.  This is also the case for Momentum.   
The coefficient of Diversification has the expected sign (negative) in the last three 
horizons, indicating that firms with large meat and poultry production/sales segments are more 
affected after a recall.  However, this coefficient is not significant in any of the horizons. Moreover, 
the coefficient of Subsidiary has the expected sign (positive) indicating that recalls initiated by a 
subsidiary have lesser impact on the parent firm, compared to recalls initiated by the parent firm 
itself.  However, these are not statistically significant.  On the other hand, the coefficient of Initial 
Shock is negative and statistically significant only in the first horizon.  The magnitude of this 
coefficient implies that stocks suffering a negative price shock after a recall, experience reversals. 
That is, about 0.56 percent of the event day move is reversed over a 5-day trading day horizon. 
Focusing on the variables that are accumulated over each horizon, unexpected results are 
observed.  That is, the coefficient of Media Index is negative in the first and second horizon but 
not statistically significant.  Then, it becomes positive and significant in the fourth horizon.  This 
is not congruent with the expectations that an increase in the number of articles covering a recall, 
would send to the stock market a negative signal and, in turn, impact stock returns.  Similarly, the 
coefficient of Trading Volume is positive and significant in the second and third horizons.  
Although several hypotheses have been proposed regarding the relationship between trading 
volume and stock returns, it seems more plausible that a meat recall would trigger an increase in 
the number of shares traded while prices drop, at least during the first days after the recall.  Thus, 
the sign of this coefficient in the first horizon is unexpected.  A possible explanation for these 
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findings relies on the construction of these variables.  That is, by accumulating them over different 
horizons, the true underlying relationship between these variables and 𝐶𝐴𝑅s cannot be estimated.  
Hence, the need of estimating models using a panel data framework. 
Results from the estimation of cross-sectional models (for w2) using observations from 
different horizons are presented in Table 5.10.  Comparing these results to those from w1, there 
are few differences.  Although, models from both w1 and w2 have the same fit, the predictive 
power of all w2 models is higher (based on AIC).  This is very important because one of the 
objectives of this analysis is to predict abnormal returns.  In addition, coefficients have the same 
sign and the same variables are statistically significant in both models.  However, the magnitude 
of the intercept in w1 is larger than w2.  Based on these findings, it can be concluded that the 
estimation of cross-sectional models is sensitive to the selection of estimation windows. 
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Table 5.9.  Estimation Results from Cross-Sectional Models [w1] 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 𝜏′ = [+1, +5] 𝜏′ = [+1, +10] 𝜏′ = [+1, +15] 𝜏′ = [+1, +20] 
Intercept -20.388 ** -10.700  -1.662  -5.316  
 [-2.035]  [-0.796]  [-0.101]  [-0.254]  
Class I -1.162  -1.682  -1.206  -0.838  
 [-1.196]  [-1.621]  [-0.886]  [-0.504]  
Recall Size -0.251  -0.468 ** -0.634 * -0.783 * 
 [-1.394]  [-2.113]  [-1.833]  [-1.740]  
Firm Size 1.018 ** 0.803  0.456  0.674  
 [2.277]  [1.299]  [0.595]  [0.674]  
Pathogen 0.443  -0.475  -0.263  -2.437  
 [0.514]  [-0.478]  [-0.164]  [-1.294]  
Experience 2.379 *** 2.087 ** 2.131 * 2.128  
 [3.188]  [2.468]  [1.887]  [1.616]  
HACCP -1.196  -2.970 * -2.786  -3.185  
 [-1.011]  [-1.661]  [-1.442]  [-1.263]  
Cluster 0.003  -0.274  -0.366  0.441  
 [0.004]  [-0.276]  [-0.276]  [0.274]  
Media Index -0.042  -0.008  0.018  0.078 *** 
 [-1.386]  [-0.846]  [1.194]  [3.552]  
Momentum 0.013  -0.016  -0.036  -0.035  
 [0.854]  [-0.836]  [-1.276]  [-0.967]  
Diversification 0.727  -0.390  -0.796  -1.857  
 [0.844]  [-0.375]  [-0.595]  [-1.254]  
Initial Shock -0.562 ** -0.301  -0.140  0.220  
 [-2.369]  [-1.121]  [-0.271]  [0.401]  
Trading Volume 0.054  0.100 *** 0.089 ** 0.048  
 [0.412]  [2.613]  [2.303]  [1.268]  
Subsidiary 0.259  1.380  1.076  1.618  
 [0.295]  [1.351]  [0.803]  [1.055]  
Adjusted R2 0.176 
 
0.113 
 
0.018 
 
0.056 
 
No. Observations 150  150  150  150  
AIC 489.4  532.7  622.6  677.6  
Notes: Numbers in brackets are t-values calculated using robust standard errors.  
 ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively. 
w1= [-260, -11] trading days, is the estimation window used to predict normal returns, which in turn are 
used to calculate abnormal returns.   
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Table 5.10.  Estimation Results from Cross-Sectional Models [w2] 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 𝜏′ = [+1, +5] 𝜏′ = [+1, +10] 𝜏′ = [+1, +15] 𝜏′ = [+1, +20] 
Intercept -18.770 ** -10.553  -1.771  -5.982  
 [-2.034]  [-0.809]  [-0.110]  [-0.283]  
Class I -1.051  -1.496  -0.975  -0.604  
 [-1.074]  [-1.449]  [-0.725]  [-0.365]  
Recall Size -0.239  -0.464 ** -0.634 * -0.800 * 
 [-1.360]  [-2.144]  [-1.852]  [-1.773]  
Firm Size 0.939 ** 0.793  0.456  0.708  
 [2.313]  [1.322]  [0.604]  [0.697]  
Pathogen 0.493  -0.437  -0.265  -2.411  
 [0.580]  [-0.444]  [-0.166]  [-1.281]  
Experience 2.316 *** 1.949 ** 1.910 * 1.896  
 [3.137]  [2.336]  [1.721]  [1.468]  
HACCP -1.204  -3.115 * -2.948  -3.389  
 [-1.027]  [-1.739]  [-1.530]  [-1.323]  
Cluster 0.053  -0.214  -0.262  0.577  
 [0.068]  [-0.215]  [-0.198]  [0.360]  
Media Index -0.041  -0.008  0.018  0.078 *** 
 [-1.337]  [-0.825]  [1.207]  [3.532]  
Momentum 0.011  -0.016  -0.034  -0.030  
 [0.752]  [-0.906]  [-1.237]  [-0.835]  
Diversification 0.687  -0.346  -0.672  -1.741  
 [0.800]  [-0.331]  [-0.506]  [-1.181]  
Initial Shock -0.591 ** -0.380  -0.236  0.073  
 [-2.556]  [-1.506]  [-0.467]  [0.139]  
Trading Volume 0.043  0.100 *** 0.088 ** 0.046  
 [0.332]  [2.622]  [2.292]  [1.222]  
Subsidiary 0.210  1.405  1.160  1.712  
 [0.243]  [1.389]  [0.872]  [1.120]  
Adjusted R2 0.176 
 
0.113 
 
0.018 
 
0.056 
 
No. Observations 150 
 
150 
 
150 
 
150 
 
AIC 485.2 
 
529.8 
 
619.6 
 
676.7 
 
Notes: Numbers in brackets are t-values calculated using robust standard errors.  
 ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively. 
w2 = [-255, -6] trading days, is the estimation window used to predict normal returns, which in turn are 
used to calculate abnormal returns.   
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 5.2.2 Results from Panel Data Models 
To estimate the panel data models, observations from each recall are pooled over horizons 
ranging from 5 to 20 trading days.  The dependent variable is either 𝐶𝐴𝑅 or 𝐴𝑅 and the independent 
variables are the same explanatory variables as used in the cross-sectional models, except for 
Trading Volume and Media Index which both vary over time in the panel models.  For instance, in 
the model estimated using observations from a 5-trading day horizon, Media Index is specified as 
the number of articles issued per day on days 1 to 5 after the recall announcement.  Focusing on 
panel models that use 𝐶𝐴𝑅 as the dependent variable, these are a special case of long-horizon 
regressions.  In these types of regressions, the independent variables do not necessarily need to be 
aggregated (Campbell and Shiller, 1988; Fama and French, 1988).  In addition, time dummies are 
added to control for time effects in each model.  For example, in 5-trading day horizon models, 
four dummies are included, where for day 1 the time dummy is specified as 1 if day equals 1 and 
0 otherwise. The same specification applies for days 2-4. 
The selection of the appropriate estimation method for panel data models was based on the 
following criteria: i) the estimation of the effects of time-invariant explanatory variables cannot be 
performed using (within) fixed effects models.22  ii) The focus of this analysis is to draw inferences 
about the population and not only about the group of recalls in this sample. Thus, random effects 
or pooled OLS models are preferred over fixed effects models. iii)  Testing for individual random 
effects when there is serial correlation might bias the results (Wooldridge, 2002).  Results from 
this type of test suggest that in models estimated using 𝐶𝐴𝑅 as the dependent variable, there are 
significant unobserved effects.  This is not true, however, for models estimated using 𝐴𝑅 as the 
                                                 
22 An alternative would be to estimate the fixed effects model including a dummy variable for each recall.  However, 
a disadvantage of using this approach is the loss of degrees of freedom.  
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dependent variable.23 iv) Random effects estimators require stronger assumptions about the 
unobservable individual effects compared to pooled OLS estimators.  Additionally, the pooled 
OLS estimator is still unbiased but inefficient.  Based on these criteria and on the nonstandard 
structure of the panels, models are estimated using pooled OLS and inferences are conducted using 
clustered-robust standard errors, where each firm is considered a separate cluster.24  This method 
is used to account for firm-specific, unobservable, time-invariant effects in the model (e.g., firm’s 
management strategy, production practices outside of HAACP, percentage of shares owned by 
management). 
Table 5.11 presents the results from pooled OLS models (for w1) estimated using 𝐶𝐴𝑅 as 
the dependent variable, over different post-event horizons (note that the number of observations 
vary depending on the horizon).  Similarly to cross-sectional models estimation, Class III 
observations are excluded because of statistical (multicollinearity) and economic issues. 
Comparing these results to those from cross-sectional models, the adjusted R2 indicates that pooled 
OLS models have a better fit of the data.  This is related to the increase in statistical significance 
in some of the variables (e.g., Recall Size, Firm Size, Experience and Initial Shock).  In addition, 
some coefficients differ in magnitude and in few instances in sign.  The most noteworthy difference 
is in the coefficients of Media Index.  These are negative in all horizons and statistically significant 
in the first three.  For instance, the coefficient in the first horizon indicates that an additional recall-
related article, published within 5 days after the recall announcement, decreases 𝐶𝐴𝑅 by 0.102 
percent, on average.  Additionally, the magnitude of these coefficients decrease as the horizon 
                                                 
23 The test used is the likelihood-based Lagrange multiplier test of Breusch and Godfrey (with refinements by Honda). 
24 The reference of nonstandard structure of the panels is used to indicate that panels are constructed using recalls that 
occurred over time and are not cross-sectionally related (except in some cases). 
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increases, indicating that the effects of media dissipates over time.  These findings indicate that 
the use of a panel data framework reveal the impacts over time of this time-variant explanatory 
variable.  This is not the case, however, for Trading Volume.  Although it was expected that 
Trading Volume would have a negative sign on the first horizon, it is positive and insignificant (it 
follows that this slope remains positive and significant in the last three horizons).   
Table 5.12 reports the results from the pooled OLS models (for w1) estimated using 𝐴𝑅 as 
the dependent variable, over different post-event horizons.  As expected, the goodness of fit of 
these models is much smaller than those estimated using 𝐶𝐴𝑅.  The magnitude of the coefficients, 
particularly the intercept, is also smaller on these models.    For example, the coefficient of Firm 
Size is approximately 4 times smaller in models using 𝐴𝑅.  This finding reflects the difference 
between using an aggregated variable versus a disaggregated one.  Furthermore, the coefficients 
of some variables became insignificant at a particular horizon.  This is the case for Recall Size, 
Firm Size and Initial Shock.  On the contrary, Media Index became also statistically significant on 
the fourth horizon, making it one of the most important explanatory variables in these models.  
Other variables that remain significant are Experience (all horizons) and Trading Volume (last 
three horizons).  Both panels using 𝐶𝐴𝑅 and panels using 𝐴𝑅 are explained by the same statistically 
significant variables in the 5-trading day horizon.   Altogether, these findings corroborate those 
from previous studies indicating that the use of long-horizon variables allows finding significant 
results (Valkanov, 2003; Hjakmarsoon, 2011). 
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Table 5.11.  Estimation Results from Pooled OLS Models Using CAR [w1] 
 Panel 1 Panel 2 Panel 3 Panel 4 
 𝜏′ = [+1, +5] 𝜏′ = [+1, +10] 𝜏′ = [+1, +15] 𝜏′ = [+1, +20] 
Intercept -13.387 * -12.825  -9.271  -6.174  
 [-1.798]  [-1.493]  [-0.890]  [-0.525]  
Class I -0.511  -0.965  -1.276  -1.144  
 [-0.803]  [-1.229]  [-1.497]  [-1.180]  
Recall Size -0.268 * -0.341 ** -0.426 ** -0.419 * 
 [-1.923]  [-2.134]  [-2.265]  [-1.864]  
Firm Size 0.732 ** 0.785 * 0.691  0.545  
 [2.063]  [1.919]  [1.384]  [0.963]  
Pathogen -0.231  -0.136  0.016  -0.015  
 [-0.385]  [-0.191]  [0.019]  [-0.015]  
Experience 1.382 *** 1.772 *** 1.863 *** 1.983 *** 
 [2.834]  [2.982]  [2.780]  [2.555]  
HACCP -0.533  -1.529  -1.833  -1.885  
 [-0.784]  [-1.576]  [-1.547]  [-1.348]  
Cluster 0.419  0.301  0.135  0.253  
 [0.727]  [0.441]  [0.173]  [0.271]  
Media Index -0.102 * -0.100 *** -0.078 ** -0.058  
 [-1.791]  [-2.631]  [-1.992]  [-1.217]  
Momentum 0.011  0.006  -0.004  -0.011  
 [1.006]  [0.467]  [-0.258]  [-0.541]  
Diversification 0.696  0.289  -0.176  -0.423  
 [1.171]  [0.409]  [-0.220]  [-0.470]  
Initial Shock -0.375 ** -0.428 ** -0.357  -0.258  
 [-2.150]  [-2.158]  [-1.379]  [-0.821]  
Trading Volume 0.092  0.384 * 0.501 ** 0.604 ** 
 [0.302]  [1.872]  [2.334]  [2.179]  
Subsidiary -0.202  0.273  0.607  0.570  
 [-0.340]  [0.389]  [0.759]  [0.622]  
Adjusted R2 0.194 
 
0.178 
 
0.133 
 
0.087 
 
No. Observations 750  1500  2250  3000  
AIC 2029.8  4631.8  7662.9  11076.1  
Time Dummies (0.162)  (0.185)  (0.688)  (0.928)  
Notes: Numbers in brackets are t-values calculated using clustered standard errors.  
 ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively. 
Numbers in parenthesis are Wald test statistics of the joint significance of time dummy variables. 
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Table 5.12.  Estimation Results from Pooled OLS Models Using AR [w1] 
 Panel 1 Panel 2 Panel 3 Panel 4 
 𝜏′ = [+1, +5] 𝜏′ = [+1, +10] 𝜏′ = [+1, +15] 𝜏′ = [+1, +20] 
Intercept -3.510 * -1.440  -0.520  -1.018  
 [-1.824]  [-1.040]  [-0.450]  [-0.883]  
Class I -0.241  -0.160  -0.072  -0.027  
 [-1.217]  [-1.517]  [-0.774]  [-0.310]  
Recall Size -0.055 * -0.033  -0.021  -0.003  
 [-1.680]  [-1.593]  [-1.003]  [-0.123]  
Firm Size 0.185 ** 0.089  0.036  0.046  
 [2.180]  [1.457]  [0.699]  [0.911]  
Pathogen 0.108  -0.043  0.005  -0.091  
 [0.606]  [-0.423]  [0.049]  [-0.940]  
Experience 0.460 *** 0.226 *** 0.169 ** 0.162 ** 
 [3.024]  [2.596]  [2.162]  [2.110]  
HACCP -0.201  -0.304 * -0.184  -0.166  
 [-0.885]  [-1.684]  [-1.446]  [-1.283]  
Cluster 0.012  -0.020  -0.008  0.042  
 [0.074]  [-0.190]  [-0.082]  [0.466]  
Media Index -0.036 * -0.035 *** -0.033 *** -0.026 *** 
 [-1.702]  [-2.887]  [-2.869]  [-2.692]  
Momentum 0.003  -0.002  -0.003  -0.002  
 [0.965]  [-0.936]  [-1.344]  [-1.146]  
Diversification 0.128  -0.019  -0.036  -0.063  
 [0.731]  [-0.174]  [-0.387]  [-0.740]  
Initial Shock -0.113 ** -0.028  -0.008  0.013  
 [-2.386]  [-1.022]  [-0.229]  [0.455]  
Trading Volume -0.042  0.169 ** 0.175 *** 0.234 ** 
 [-0.298]  [2.540]  [3.041]  [1.959]  
Subsidiary 0.034  0.141  0.066  0.079  
 [0.192]  [1.358]  [0.719]  [0.988]  
Adjusted R2 0.038 
 
0.012 
 
0.005 
 
0.009 
 
No. Observations 750  1500  2250  3000  
AIC 1219.4  2360.2  3424.5  4579.5  
Time Dummies (0.828)  (0.754)  (0.850)  (0.339)  
Notes: Numbers in brackets are t-values calculated using clustered standard errors.  
 ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively. 
Numbers in parenthesis are Wald test statistics of the joint significance of time dummy variables.  
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Results from the estimation of pooled OLS models for w2, using 𝐶𝐴𝑅 and 𝐴𝑅 as dependent 
variables, are presented in Table 5.13 and Table 5.14, respectively.  There are important 
differences between these results to those from w1.  That is, models from w2 estimated using 𝐶𝐴𝑅 
have a slightly better fit than models from w1 and same fit on models estimated using 𝐴𝑅.  
Similarly to results from cross-sectional models, the predictive power of all w2 models is higher 
than in w1 models.  Moreover, coefficients have the same sign and the same variables are 
statistically significant in both models, except for Recall Size which is only significant in panel 1 
(w1) estimated using 𝐴𝑅.  Slight differences also exist on the magnitudes of the coefficients.  These 
are more evident, however, on the intercepts.  Therefore, results from the estimation of panel 
models are also sensitive to the selection of estimation windows.  Based on this finding, simulation 
examples in the following section are based on results from w2 models. 
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Table 5.13.  Estimation Results from Pooled OLS Models Using CAR [w2] 
 Panel 1 Panel 2 Panel 3 Panel 4 
 𝜏′ = [+1, +5] 𝜏′ = [+1, +10] 𝜏′ = [+1, +15] 𝜏′ = [+1, +20] 
Intercept -12.295 * -11.955  -8.569  -5.871  
 [-1.836]  [-1.513]  [-0.879]  [-0.519]  
Class I -0.450  -0.860  -1.127  -0.972  
 [-0.700]  [-1.089]  [-1.324]  [-1.007]  
Recall Size -0.255 * -0.326 ** -0.415 * -0.414 * 
 [-1.917]  [-2.149]  [-2.303]  [-1.891]  
Firm Size 0.677 ** 0.739 ** 0.653  0.528  
 [2.139]  [1.982]  [1.403]  [0.970]  
Pathogen -0.182  -0.084  0.055  0.015  
 [-0.311]  [-0.121]  [0.066]  [0.016]  
Experience 1.348 *** 1.693 *** 1.740 *** 1.832 ** 
 [2.809]  [2.897]  [2.658]  [2.414]  
HACCP -0.534  -1.582  -1.913  -2.004  
 [-0.800]  [-1.643]  [-1.625]  [-1.431]  
Cluster 0.435  0.331  0.182  0.316  
 [0.760]  [0.487]  [0.235]  [0.341]  
Media Index -0.101 * -0.101 *** -0.079 ** -0.058  
 [-1.742]  [-2.643]  [-2.038]  [-1.213]  
Momentum 0.010  0.005  -0.005  -0.010  
 [0.961]  [0.382]  [-0.326]  [-0.544]  
Diversification 0.654  0.282  -0.150  -0.366  
 [1.108]  [0.400]  [-0.189]  [-0.410]  
Initial Shock -0.406 ** -0.473 ** -0.420 * -0.335  
 [-2.502]  [-2.535]  [-1.723]  [-1.122]  
Trading Volume 0.062  0.379 * 0.496 ** 0.600 ** 
 [0.208]  [1.859]  [2.336]  [2.194]  
Subsidiary -0.238  0.248  0.610  0.593  
 [-0.408]  [0.359]  [0.777]  [0.655]  
Adjusted R2 0.193 
 
0.178 
 
0.135 
 
0.090 
 
No. Observations 750  1500  2250  3000  
AIC 2001.23  4583.8  7587.9  11001.9  
Time Dummies (0.153)  (0.136)  (0.599)  (0.889)  
Notes: Numbers in brackets are t-values calculated using clustered standard errors.  
 ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively. 
Numbers in parenthesis are Wald test statistics of the joint significance of time dummy variables. 
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Table 5.14.  Estimation Results from Pooled OLS Models Using AR [w2] 
 Panel 1 Panel 2 Panel 3 Panel 4 
 𝜏′ = [+1, +5] 𝜏′ = [+1, +10] 𝜏′ = [+1, +15] 𝜏′ = [+1, +20] 
Intercept -3.215 * -1.426  -0.530  -1.062  
 [-1.823]  [-1.062]  [-0.467]  [-0.914]  
Class I -0.218  -0.141  -0.057  -0.016  
 [-1.095]  [-1.347]  [-0.615]  [-0.177]  
Recall Size -0.052  -0.033  -0.022  -0.004  
 [-1.634]  [-1.604]  [-1.021]  [-0.168]  
Firm Size 0.170 ** 0.088  0.036  0.048  
 [2.216]  [1.484]  [0.714]  [0.938]  
Pathogen 0.118  -0.040  0.004  -0.091  
 [0.667]  [-0.394]  [0.035]  [-0.943]  
Experience 0.449 *** 0.212 ** 0.154 ** 0.150 ** 
 [2.973]  [2.466]  [2.003]  [1.986]  
HACCP -0.204  -0.319 * -0.196  -0.177  
 [-0.903]  [-1.764]  [-1.540]  [-1.351]  
Cluster 0.022  -0.014  -0.001  0.048  
 [0.135]  [-0.134]  [-0.015]  [0.536]  
Media Index -0.036 * -0.034 *** -0.032 *** -0.025 *** 
 [-1.696]  [-2.937]  [-2.932]  [-2.726]  
Momentum 0.003  -0.002  -0.003  -0.002  
 [0.869]  [-1.006]  [-1.312]  [-1.033]  
Diversification 0.121  -0.015  -0.028  -0.057  
 [0.692]  [-0.134]  [-0.299]  [-0.668]  
Initial Shock -0.118 *** -0.036  -0.015  0.005  
 [-2.580]  [-1.402]  [-0.428]  [0.194]  
Trading Volume -0.048  0.169 ** 0.175 *** 0.234 ** 
 [-0.344]  [2.539]  [3.040]  [1.971]  
Subsidiary 0.025  0.144  0.072  0.084  
 [0.142]  [1.395]  [0.793]  [1.060]  
Adjusted R2 0.038 
 
0.012 
 
0.005 
 
0.009 
 
No. Observations 750  1500  2250  3000  
AIC 1210.7  2337.4  3384.8  4535.3  
Time Dummies (0.786)  (0.690)  (0.812)  (0.333)  
Notes: Numbers in brackets are t-values calculated using clustered standard errors.  
 ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively. 
Numbers in parenthesis are Wald test statistics of the joint significance of time dummy variables. 
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 5.3 Application Examples 
This assessment is intended to demonstrate how estimated results can be interpreted on real 
life applications.  Here, the focus is on meat and poultry recall characteristics that are statistically 
significant.  First, consider the average recall in this sample.  This is a 42,000 pounds recall 
(equivalently to 10.64 in natural logs) issued by a firm with a value of market equity of $4 billion 
(equivalently to 22.15 in natural logs).  In addition, 7 articles were published about this recall 
within 1 to 5 days after its announcement.  Table 5.15 reports the individual effects of Recall Size, 
Firm Size and Media Index on 𝐶𝐴𝑅 over a 5-trading day horizon.  The effects of these 
characteristics are analyzed over different scenarios and are relative to the average recall.  This 
table is constructed using results from Table 5.13 (panel 1).  Column “Ave. R” represents the 
average recall and columns R1 to R6 represent a recall scenario for a particular characteristic.  Note 
that Experience is not included in this table since there are only two scenarios based on this 
characteristic: firms that had a recall in the past year and firms that did not.  In this sample, the 
average recall was issued by a firm that did not have a recall in the past year.   
Table 5.15.  Effects of Meat Recall Characteristics on CAR over a 5-Day Horizon 
 R1 R2 Ave. R R3 R4 R5 R6 
Recall Size 
Pounds 6,000 15,500 42,000 115,000 310,000 850,000 2,300,000 
% 𝐶𝐴𝑅 +0.510 +0.255 - -0.255 -0.510 -0.765 -1.02 
Firm Size 
ME 0.5 billion 1.5 billion 4 billion 11 billion 30 billion 83 billion 227 billion 
% 𝐶𝐴𝑅 -1.354 -0.677 - +0.677 +1.354 +2.031 +2.708 
Media Index 
Articles -5 -1 7 +1 +5 +10 +15 
% 𝐶𝐴𝑅 +0.505 +0.101 - -0.101 -0.505 -1.010 -1.515 
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The following is an example that illustrates the use of this table.  Consider a 310,000 pound 
ground beef recall issued by a firm with a value of market equity of $1.5 billion and with media 
coverage of 12 articles within the first 5 days after the recall announcement.  In addition, this is 
the first time this firm issues a meat recall.  Looking at table 5.15, the marginal effect of Recall 
Size on 𝐶𝐴𝑅 is -0.510, of Firm Size is -0.667 and of Media Index is -0.505.  Also, the marginal 
effect of Experience in this example is zero. Adding up all these effects results in a 1.682 percent 
decrease on 𝐶𝐴𝑅, relative to the average recall.  Now, in this sample the average 𝐶𝐴𝑅, regardless 
of the recall class, is -0.620 (table 5.3).  Therefore, the total impact of this recall on the firm’s 𝐶𝐴𝑅 
is (-1.682) + (-0.620) = -2.302 percent.  That is, after 5 days of the recall announcement, stock 
returns are expected to decrease by 2.302 percent.  
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Chapter 6 - Conclusions 
Food recalls can potentially cause significant economic losses for food firms.  However, 
the assessment of the overall impact that may result from a food recall requires a thorough 
understanding of the costs incurred by firms.  A direct measurement of a firm’s total costs and 
losses of revenue associated with a recall requires firm-level data that is not available.  Thus, 
quantifying these costs is daunting if not impossible.  The method utilized in this study overcomes 
this severe limitation.  Using an event study, the impact of meat and poultry recalls is quantified 
by analyzing price reactions in financial markets, where it is expected that stock prices would 
reflect the overall economic impact of a recall through the impact on the future profitability of the 
firm involved.  Then, recall and firm specific characteristics are introduced in a second analysis to 
evaluate whether these are economic drivers of the magnitude of impact of meat and poultry recalls 
on stock prices.  These group of characteristics are: severity of the threat, recall size, firm size, 
level of diversification, media information surrounding the recall, firm’s experience and important 
meat industry events.  In particular, this second analysis is a unique contribution of this study. 
 6.1 Summary of Main Findings 
The main findings of this study are summarized as follows.  First, consistent with Thomsen 
and McKenzie (2001), Class I recalls have a negative impact on the stock market value of firms, 
whereas Class II and Class III recalls have little discernable impact.  On average, shareholder 
wealth is reduced by 1.15 percent within 5 days after a Class I recall announcement.  This is most 
likely because of the human health risk involved in this type of recalls.  Considering that direct 
costs associated with both Class I and Class II recalls are similar, the main difference is that Class 
I recalls affect the profitability of the firm by reducing the firm’s revenues.  Since revenues are 
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affected by consumers (and customers) responses, this suggests that stock markets react to negative 
impacts on the demand side.  On the other hand, contradicting results from Thomsen and 
McKenzie (2001), shareholders’ losses are not persistent.  Returns start going back to pre-event 
levels after day 20.  Furthermore, stock markets do not appear to become aware of a recall before 
FSIS releases the official recall announcement.  
Moreover, from a more technical perspective, results are sensitive to the selection of 
estimation and event windows.  That is, since the event study approach relies on forecasting 
methods, the predictive power of benchmark models is influenced by the length of the forecasting 
horizon.  Thus, it is important to caution researchers about this issue. 
Findings related to the analysis of the impact of meat recall characteristics on stock market 
returns, suggest there are several important recall and firm specific factors driving the magnitude 
of this economic impact.  These factors are: recall size, firm size, firm’s experience and media 
information.  Results related to recall size indicate that firms recalling a larger amount of product 
perceive greater reductions in company valuations.  Furthermore, recalls issued by large firms are 
less likely to present negative effects on stock prices, compared to smaller firms. 
Focusing on firm’s experience, results confirm those from Salin and Hooker (2001) and 
Wang et al. (2002).  That is, firms with a recent history of implication in a meat and poultry recall 
(more precisely over the past year), are less harmed by a new recall, compared to those firms 
issuing a recall for first time (or not issuing a recall in a while).  This finding suggests that investors 
take into consideration the past performance of a company when dealing with food recalls at the 
moment of making their valuations.  Additionally, findings regarding media information indicate 
that recall-related articles published within 20 trading days after the recall announcement, have a 
negative impact on shareholder’s wealth.  This result corroborates that stock markets react to 
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situations affecting the demand side, since it is assumed that consumers and customers are directly 
exposed to media information. 
 6.2 Implications 
Several implications for food companies, particularly regarding recall management, can be 
derived from this study.  One of these implications is related to recall size.  Firms should try to 
rapidly identify the contaminated product, perhaps by testing products in smaller lots, so that 
recalls of massive amounts of product are less likely.  These massive recalls are immensely costly 
to the firm and result in sizeable stock price impacts which can potentially turn into firm 
bankruptcies.  Additionally, this study provides implications for firm size.  In particular, small 
firms should invest more of their total firms’ value in food safety technologies and protocols as 
they have greater risk of bankruptcy. 
Another implication of this study is related to the firm’s experience, which is more 
precisely measuring the experience that recurrent firms have on managing food recalls.  This is 
based on the premise that recurrent firms appear to be sending positive signals to the stock market, 
indicating investors not to consider a food recall a threat.  Therefore, other firms without 
experience handling a food recall, need to learn from recurrent firms that have successfully 
managed food recalls.   
The implication of media information is that once news reach the public, these will have a 
negative impact on the firm’s valuation.  Therefore, having a plan in place to deal with this 
situation is important.  Recommendations concerning appropriate strategies for managing the 
influence of media fall outside of the scope of this study.  Nevertheless, companies need to be 
ready to implement those plans to try to reduce the adverse impacts of media while dealing with a 
food recall. 
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Finally, the implication for investors is that although the effects of food recalls on stock prices 
appear to be short-lived, there are certain factors such as firm size, recall size and media 
information that can potentially cause substantial shareholders’ loses.  Therefore, while interested 
in an industry with a high level of food safety risk, investors may want to know more about the 
firm’s food safety strategy before investing. 
 6.3 Future Research 
This study focuses on analyzing the effects of meat and poultry recalls on own stock price 
valuations.  However, it can also be extended to evaluate the spillover effects of a recall on other 
firms.  That is, an interesting question unanswered in this study is whether the industry as a whole 
loses after a meat and poultry recall to any firm or, whether rival firms benefit from this food safety 
incident.  One of the advantages of conducting this analysis is that it is not necessary to evaluate 
the effects of recalls affecting publicly traded firms.  That is, one could evaluate spillover effects 
of a recall affecting a private firm on stock prices of publicly traded rivals.   
Moreover, food safety incidents have the potential to affect both stock prices and volatility 
of stock returns.  Therefore, another extension of this study would be to analyze the effects of meat 
and poultry recalls on the volatility of stock returns.  However, one of the limitations in conducting 
such analysis relies on the availability of data.  According to Andersen et al. (2001) previous work 
has relied on daily return observations for the construction of monthly realized stock volatilities. 
Yet, monthly measures of abnormal volatilities may not be able to capture all the relevant 
information found in daily price movements.  This is because it is expected that the effects of some 
meat recalls on returns’ volatility would last only few days after the recall.  Data corresponding to 
daily standard deviations based on 15-minute equity returns will be needed to estimate daily stock 
volatilities.  Unfortunately, this information is not easily accessible.  Another possibility would be 
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to use daily implied volatilities calculated using options or other derivatives prices.  However, the 
estimation of such volatilities alone would be difficult since not every publicly traded food firm 
may trade options.   
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Appendix A - Results from the Calculation of CAAR by Class for w2 
Table A.1.  Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns [w2], Class I Recalls 
 𝜏1 = −5 𝜏1 = −2 𝜏1 = 0 
𝜏2 CAAR 𝑍𝐵𝑀𝑃 𝑍𝐺𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾 CAAR 𝑍𝐵𝑀𝑃 𝑍𝐺𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾 CAAR 𝑍𝐵𝑀𝑃 𝑍𝐺𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾 
          
-5 0.209 0.448 -0.005       
-1 0.290 -0.049 0.068 -0.088 -0.557 -0.466    
0 0.210 -0.188 -0.419 -0.168 -0.650    -1.288** -0.080 -0.370 -0.788 
1 0.021 -0.376 -0.624 -0.358 -0.812    -1.570** -0.269 -0.682    -1.360** 
2 -0.074 -0.243 -0.491 -0.452 -0.588    -1.768** -0.364 -0.353    -1.306** 
3 -0.380 -0.494 -0.446 -0.758 -0.845    -1.921** -0.670 -0.704    -1.545** 
4 -0.759 -1.052    -1.550** -1.138    -1.472**    -2.799** -1.049    -1.541**    -2.801** 
5 -0.859    -1.285**    -1.598** -1.238    -1.722**    -2.887** -1.149    -1.818**    -2.796** 
10 -0.804 -0.831    -2.011** -1.182 -1.107    -2.886** -1.094 -0.950    -2.394** 
15 -0.623 -0.817    -1.403** -1.002 -1.000    -1.882** -0.913 -0.876    -1.570** 
20 -1.348 -1.228    -1.721** -1.726    -1.359**    -2.096** -1.638 -1.276    -1.998** 
 𝜏1 = 1 
𝜏2 CAAR 𝑍𝐵𝑀𝑃 𝑍𝐺𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾 
    
-5    
-1    
0    
1 -0.190 -0.497 -1.159 
2 -0.284 -0.142 -0.869 
3 -0.590 -0.565 -1.095 
4 -0.970    -1.461**    -2.500** 
5 -1.070    -1.712**    -2.389** 
10 -1.014 -0.880    -2.256** 
15 -0.834 -0.825    -1.388** 
20 -1.558 -1.241    -1.741** 
Note: ** and * denote statistical significance at the 0.05 and 0.10 level for a one tailed test (equation 12).   
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Figure A.1  Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns [w2] for Class I Recalls 
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Table A.2.  Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns [w2], Class II Recalls 
 𝜏1 = −5 𝜏1 = −2 𝜏1 = 0 
𝜏2 CAAR 𝑍𝐵𝑀𝑃 𝑍𝐺𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾 CAAR 𝑍𝐵𝑀𝑃 𝑍𝐺𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾 CAAR 𝑍𝐵𝑀𝑃 𝑍𝐺𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾 
          
-5 0.156 0.325 0.586       
-1 0.644 -0.029 0.963 0.550 -0.288 0.387    
0 0.780 -0.125 0.793 0.685 -0.314 0.470 0.136 -0.156 0.477 
1 0.710 -0.265 0.795 0.616 -0.481 0.351 0.066 -0.362 -0.140 
2 0.948 -0.156 1.198 0.853 -0.342 1.042 0.303 -0.209 0.860 
3 1.185 -0.318 1.261 1.091 -0.497 1.190 0.541 -0.455 1.240 
4 1.306 -0.595 1.225 1.212 -0.782 1.032 0.662 -0.830 0.779 
5 0.964 -0.654 0.633 0.870 -0.836 0.447 0.320 -0.836 -0.016 
10 1.855 -0.472  1.471* 1.761 -0.604   1.493* 1.211 -0.544 0.916 
15 1.463 -0.465 0.768 1.368 -0.574 0.736 0.818 -0.526 0.308 
20 0.408 -0.664 0.050 0.313 -0.736 0.114 -0.236 -0.705 -0.150 
 𝜏1 = 1 
𝜏2 CAAR 𝑍𝐵𝑀𝑃 𝑍𝐺𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾 
    
-5    
-1    
0    
1 -0.070 -0.320 -0.202 
2 0.168 -0.100 0.716 
3 0.405 -0.417 1.029 
4 0.526 -0.821 0.772 
5 0.184 -0.827 -0.283 
10 1.075 -0.547 0.806 
15 0.683 -0.508 0.048 
20 -0.372 -0.722 -0.295 
Note: * denotes statistical significance at the 0.10 level for two tailed test (𝐻0: 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 = 0 and 𝐻𝑎: 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 ≠ 0).   
 
